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ABSTRACT 
 
We study the impact of the minimum wage hike in Seattle from $9.47 to $13 on wagebill, labor 
demand, and firm revenue using administrative data from the state of Washington. We show that the 
minimum wage affected businesses both at the intensive and extensive margins. At the intensive margin, 
businesses increased their labor costs and adjusted to the minimum wage by mildly reducing demand for 
low-wage jobs, but they largely did not pass the increase in labor costs to prices. At the extensive margin, the 
minimum wage led to higher rates of business exit and shifted the composition of entering businesses towards 
less labor-intensive businesses. Finally, we find that the extensive margin and the intensive margin effects 
were of the same order of magnitude, and were equally important for understanding the impacts of the 
minimum wage. 
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In this paper we revisit the question of how businesses respond to the minimum wage 
using evidence from a large minimum wage hike in Seattle. In 2014 the City of Seattle passed 
the Minimum Wage Ordinance, which raised the minimum wage to $15 over several years. We 
examine the minimum wage effect during the first two phase-in periods, when the minimum 
wage went from $9.47 to $11, and then to $13.1
 
We focus on two questions: 1) Did employers 
use the labor market or the product market as the primary channel of adjustment to the minimum 
wage? and 2) What was the role of the intensive margin effect (within-firm adjustment of the 
surviving firms) versus the extensive margin effect (business entry and exit)? 
Our study draws on two linked confidential datasets on firms from the State of 
Washington: data on payroll records from Washington’s Unemployment Insurance (UI) program 
and data on business revenue from the Washington Department of Revenue. These two datasets 
have several features that make them uniquely positioned for study of the impact of minimum 
wage on businesses’ adjustment strategies. First, Washington is one of the four states in the 
United States that collects not only quarterly earnings for each worker on payroll, but also 
requires employers to report quarterly hours worked. As a result, we can precisely measure the 
cost of compliance with the minimum wage for each business. We calculate the cost of 
compliance as the percentage increase in the wagebill required to meet the new minimum wage 
if a business keeps the number of jobs and hours at the pre-policy level. Second, the UI records 
from the State of Washington cover the universe of private sector companies in the state, 
providing a 6-digit NAICS code for each firm. This allows us to study employers’ adjustment 
strategies across the entire market without restricting our analysis to low-paying industries such 
                                                 
1 The Seattle Minimum Wage Ordinance adopted different minimum wage schedules depending on the 
number of employees in a firm and whether a firm contributes toward health benefits. We discuss these minimum 
wage schedules in detail in the next section. 
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as restaurants and retail, as many previous studies have had to do. Third, Washington State 
collects a Business and Occupation tax on most businesses in the private sector, which is 
calculated as a share of gross quarterly revenue, allowing us to explore product and labor market 
adjustments at the same time. 
We estimate the impact of the minimum wage hike on business outcomes by comparing 
Seattle businesses with lower costs of compliance to businesses with higher costs of compliance 
via a difference-in-differences approach. Our identification strategy relies on the assumption that 
the difference between employers with zero costs of compliance and employers with positive 
costs of compliance in 2015–2016 would have been similar to the prior years if the minimum 
wage ordinance had not been implemented. We argue that this assumption is reasonable by 
showing that the samples of exposed and non-exposed employers are balanced in size, age, and 
revenue relative to the prior years, and by demonstrating that the wage increases in exposed 
firms start exactly in the quarter when the minimum wage hikes were implemented. Lastly, we 
perform a falsification test by estimating the effect of a placebo ordinance passed in 2012 and 
find no effect of the placebo ordinance on wages. 
We find that Seattle’s firms adjusted to the minimum wage increase primarily through the 
labor market channel. Unlike many previous U.S.-based studies, we do not observe a pass-
through effect of the minimum wage to prices. We also show that these labor market adjustments 
operated along both the intensive and extensive margins. First, the minimum wage hike caused a 
mild reduction in the hours of low-wage jobs in surviving firms. We estimate that a 1 percent 
increase in wages induced by the minimum wage led to a 0.3–0.8 percent reduction in hours of 
low-wage jobs, defined as those paying less than 130 percent of the minimum wage. Next, the 
minimum wage hike increased the rate of business exits by 13 percent, accelerated the exit of 
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firms with a higher share of low-wage jobs, and shifted the composition of the entering firms 
towards less labor-intensive businesses. Together, the impacts at the intensive and the extensive 
margins resulted in a 0.6 percent uptick in total labor costs and a 1.9 percent loss in hours of low-
wage jobs. These findings imply that the aggregate low-wage employment elasticity in Seattle 
was of the order of –2. 
Although there is a vast literature on the aggregate employment effects of the minimum 
wage (for a comprehensive review, see Card and Krueger, 1995; Neumark and Wascher, 2010; 
Flinn, 2011; Belman and Wolfson, 2014), much less is known about the impact of the minimum 
wage on businesses. Prior studies produced mixed evidence on whether or not employers’ profits 
decrease as a result of a minimum wage hike (Draca, Machin, and Van Reenen, 2011), although 
several papers documented increases in revenue in response to a minimum wage (Giuliano, 
2013; Hirsch, Kaufman, and Zelenska, 2015; Brummund, 2017; Harasztosi and Lindner, 2018), 
and there are robust findings of a minimum wage pass-through to prices (Aaronson, French, and 
MacDonald, 2008; Allegretto and Reich, 2018). Evidence on the employment effects of the 
minimum wage is inconclusive as well. On the one hand, several papers based on the payroll 
data found no reduction in low-wage labor (Giuliano, 2013; Hirsch, Kaufman, and Zelenska, 
2015; Brummund, 2017). On the other, Aaronson and Phelan (2019) have demonstrated that 
businesses cut jobs in routine occupations that can be easier to automate, and Horton (2017) has 
shown that employers in an online marketplace responded to the minimum wage by cutting hours 
worked and hiring more productive workers. Gittings and Schmutte (2016) and Dube, Lester, 
and Reich (2016) have shown that minimum wage hikes lead to decreases in turnover rates, 
suggesting that lower turnover might be able to offset the rising labor costs and help to avoid 
reductions in employment. Finally, Aaronson et al. (2018) found that a minimum wage hike is 
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followed by a spike in entry and exit, suggesting that the minimum wage affects the composition 
of firms as well. 
We contribute to this literature by providing evidence from a large minimum wage 
increase in the United States. To our knowledge, this is the first study to quantify the role of 
within-firm adjustment versus effects to business exit and entry in the adjustment to a minimum 
wage using U.S. data. We find that the within-firm adjustment of the surviving firms accounted 
for only one-third of the minimum wage impact on low-wage jobs, whereas two-thirds came 
from effects along the extensive margin. 
INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND AND DATA 
Seattle’s Minimum Wage Ordinance 
In June 2014, the City of Seattle passed a law raising the minimum wage in Seattle to $15 
over the following seven years. The law had several phase-in stages, allowing small firms more 
time to switch to the $15 minimum wage as compared to large firms, giving employers tip credit, 
and introducing a lower minimum wage for employers who contribute towards medical benefits. 
The complete minimum wage schedule is presented in Table 1. The first phase-in period began 
in April 2015 and raised the minimum wage by 16.2 percent, from $9.47 to $11.2
 
The second 
phase-in period began in January 2016 and raised the minimum wage to $12 to as much as $13, 
or by 9.1 percent to 18.2 percent, depending on the schedule. 
                                                 
2 Washington has a state minimum wage, which is indexed to inflation annually on January 1 of each year. 
Although the state minimum wage steadily grew from 2005 to 2016, on average it increased only by 2.4% in 
nominal terms. A complete record of the historical minimum wage in Washington State can be found at 
http://www.ini.wa.gov/WorkplaceRights/Wages/Minimum/History/default.asp. 
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Table 1  Minimum Wage Under Seattle’s Minimum Wage Ordinance 
 Large employersa  Small employers 
 No benefits With benefitsb  No benefits or tips Benefits or tipsc 
Before Seattle MW Ordinance 
January 1, 2015 $9.47d $9.47   $9.47 $9.47 
After Seattle MW Ordinance 
April 1, 2015 $11.00 $11.00   $11.00 $10.00 
January 1, 2016 $13.00 $12.50  $12.00 $10.50 
January 1, 2017 $15.00e $13.50  $13.00 $11.00 
January 1, 2018  $15.00f  $14.00 $11.50 
January 1, 2019    $15.00g $12.00 
January 1, 2019     $13.50 
January 1, 2019         $15.00h 
a A large employer employs 501 or more employees worldwide, including all franchisees associated with a franchise or a 
network of franchises. 
b Employers who pay towards medical benefits. 
c Employers who pay towards medical benefits and/or employees who are paid tips. Total minimum hourly compensation 
(including tips and benefits) is the same as for the small employers who do not pay towards medical benefits and/or tips. 
d Before April 1, 2015 Seattle was subject to the WA minimum wage, which is indexed to inflation using CPI-W. 
e For large employers, after the minimum wage reaches $15.00, it is indexed to inflation using CPI-W for the Seattle-Tacoma-
Bremerton Area. 
f Starting January 1, 2019, payment by the employer of medical benefits for employees no longer affects the hourly minimum 
wage paid by a large employer. 
g After the minimum hourly compensation for small employers reaches $15, it goes up to $15.75 until January 1, 2021 when it 
converges with the minimum wage schedule for large employers. 
h The minimum wage for small employers with benefits or tips is projected to converge with other employers by 2025. 
 
 
In this paper, we focus on the first two phase-ins and study the period from the second 
quarter of 2014 when the ordinance was passed through the third quarter of 2016, which is the 
last period for which the data were available.3
 
We investigate each phase-in period separately and 
compare estimates of the impact of the $11 minimum wage and the $13 minimum wage.4 
                                                 
3 We cannot separate the effect of the minimum wage increase from the anticipatory effect of the following 
phase-in period. However, we do not observe any anticipatory effect before April 1, 2015, when the first minimum 
wage hike took place, which suggests that our results are indeed driven by a response to the past minimum wage 
increase rather than by an anticipation effect of the upcoming one. 
4 Even though firms were on different schedules during each phase-in, for simplicity, we refer to the first 
phase-in period as implementing the $11 minimum wage and to the second phase-in period as implementing the $13 
minimum wage. At the time of implementation, each of those wage levels was the highest minimum wage imposed 
by the ordinance on large employers that did not contribute towards health benefits. 
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Data Sources 
We use payroll data from Unemployment Insurance (UI) records collected by the 
Washington Employment Security Department and revenue data from Business and Occupation 
tax records collected by the Washington Department of Revenue. 
Though every state collects quarterly data on payroll and total employment to administer 
the UI tax, Washington is one of four states that also collect data on hours worked.5
 
As a result, 
we can directly observe the hourly compensation that each firm paid before and after the 
minimum wage hike. The dataset spans over from 2005 to 2015, which allows us to track 
businesses longitudinally.6
 
For each business, we observe the industry code at the NAICS 6-digit 
level, address of the firm, and wagebill and total hours worked for each worker who was on the 
payroll in a given quarter. The wagebill includes all compensation received by an employee, 
including tips and bonuses.7
 
However, we do not have information on non-pecuniary benefits or 
other forms of compensation, such as stock.8 
To determine if a business is covered by the Seattle’s ordinance, we geocode its business 
address and use the exact coordinates to determine if the business is located within the boundary 
of the City of Seattle. However, an important caveat arises from the fact that non-franchise 
businesses operating multiple stores can file a joint report for all their locations. As a result, we 
cannot observe which employees in these businesses work in Seattle and are therefore covered 
                                                 
5 The Employment Security Department uses the data on hours worked to determine UI eligibility, and as a 
result, the data on hours worked are considered to be very reliable. See Lachowska, Mas, and Woodbury (2018) for 
more details on the quality of the Washington data. 
6 Although payroll records are available for years before 2005, most of the business addresses in the earlier 
years are P.O. boxes rather than the physical addresses of businesses, which makes precludes us from determining if 
these businesses are covered by the Seattle Minimum Wage Ordinance. 
7 Although the IRS requires businesses to report tips received by their employees and provides regular 
audits to enforce this regulation, the amount of tips is likely to be underreported. 
8 This limitation is most substantial insofar as we are unable to distinguish employers who pay health 
benefits because the ordinance specifies a lower minimum wage for employers that offer benefits. 
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by the wage ordinance and which work outside of Seattle. Including businesses not covered by 
the ordinance would mix treated and non-treated businesses and attenuate effects of the policy. 
To overcome this problem, we focus our analysis on single-location businesses. This restriction 
excludes large companies that own their branches, but it still allows us to study franchises—
businesses with multiple locations that are owned independently. These single-location 
businesses constitute about 89 percent of all firms in Washington State and hire about 62 percent 
of all workers.9
 
On average, these businesses tend to be younger and smaller than multi-location 
businesses. They also pay lower wages than multi-location businesses, and thus are more 
exposed to the minimum wage hike than an average business in Seattle. As such, we view our 
estimates as the effect on the most vulnerable firms. 
Even though our dataset contains information on Washington businesses located outside 
of Seattle, we only include businesses located in Seattle in our sample. We chose not to use the 
cross-border design popular in other minimum wage studies (e.g., Dube, Lester, and Reich, 
2010) because the areas of Seattle-Bremerton-Tacoma Metro Area outside of the City of Seattle 
are a part of a common integrated labor market, and thus are likely to experience spillover effects 
of the Seattle minimum wage.10 Therefore, businesses outside of Seattle cannot provide a clean 
control group because they were affected by Seattle minimum wages as well.  
We merge the payroll data with quarterly data on sales collected by the Department of 
Revenue (DOR). Washington has a Business and Occupation tax on firms levied on receipts 
                                                 
9 See Jardim et al. (2017a) for a more detailed discussion on the distribution of single-site and multi-site 
businesses in the Washington UI data. 
10 In particular, Jardim et al. (2017b) showed that census tracts within a 40-minute drive from Seattle have 
seen abnormal wage growth and employment loss in low-wage jobs following the enactment of the Seattle Minimum 
Wage Ordinance, although these effects are smaller in magnitude than the minimum wage effect inside the Seattle 
city boundary. 
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from all business activities, measured as the value of products, gross proceeds of sale, or gross 
income of the business. Every business in Washington that is required to collect sales tax, has a 
gross income of $12,000 per year or more, is a buyer or processor of specialty wood products, or 
is otherwise required to pay taxes or fees to the DOR has to register with the DOR.11
 
The DOR 
collects gross income data quarterly, and also tracks when the firm opened and if and when it 
closed, which allows us to control for age of business in the analysis. 
Next, we restrict our analysis to businesses that had five or more employees on average 
through their lifetime, as is common practice in firm-level studies.12
 
Though most firms are very 
small (65 percent of all businesses in the data have fewer than five employees), these small firms 
employed only 5 percent of the workforce in Seattle in 2014. Finally, we also exclude from our 
analysis firms that contain likely reporting errors for 10 percent or more of their employees.13
 
Table 2 shows the summary statistics on the remaining sample. We are able to find revenue 
matches for 67 percent of single-location businesses employing 83 percent of the workforce. 
Restricting our analysis to firms with five or more employees and excluding firms with a large 
share of reporting errors leads to dropping another 30 percent of firms and 10 percent of the 
workforce from our analysis. In the end, we are able to study firms that account for 70 percent of 
the workforce employed by single-location businesses in Seattle. 
To study the impact of minimum wage on businesses, we split the data into cohorts as 
illustrated in Figure 1. We are interested in analyzing two treated cohorts: firms that were active 
                                                 
11 Washington State uses a unique Uniform Business Identifier (UBI) for most of reporting purposes, 
though the Employment Security Department creates its own identifier (employer account number). We define a 
business using UBI whenever available, even if one UBI corresponds to several account numbers in the payroll 
records. During the merge, we aggregate the income and payroll from all associated accounts, pick geographic 
identifiers from the largest account number within the UBI, and pick the earliest date of opening. 
12 A similar sample restriction is used, for example, in Harasztosi and Lindner (2018) and Kahn and 
McEntarfer (2014). 
13 We flag an observation as a likely reporting error if it is one with a wage rate lower than $9 per hour in 
2015 prices, reports more than 1,000 hours worked in a quarter, or has a wage rate greater than $500 per hour and 
reports fewer than 10 hours in a quarter. 
 9  
before and after the first minimum wage step-up in April of 2015, and firms that were active 
before and after the second minimum wage step-up in January of 2016. To be able to analyze the 
impact of each step-up separately, we set the baseline period in the second quarter of each 
calendar year and track firms for six subsequent quarters. As a result, the 2014 cohort starts in 
the second quarter of 2014, when the Seattle Minimum Wage Ordinance was passed, and ends in 
the fourth quarter of 2015, three quarters after the minimum wage increase to $11, and in the last 
quarter before the minimum wage hike to $13 per hour. Similarly, the 2015 cohort starts in the 
second quarter of 2015, the first period after the implementation of the $11 minimum wage, and 
ends in the third quarter of 2016, three periods after the implementation of the $13 minimum 
wage. We design control cohorts in a similar way, starting a new cohort in the second quarter of 
each calendar year. This design allows us to take into account seasonal variation in business 
activity, as well as the annual increases in the state minimum wage.14
 
Finally, because we track 
firms only for six quarters, we impose relatively weak requirements on firm age and are able to 
keep most firms in the sample. 
 
Table 2  Summary Statistics on Seattle Firms Included and Excluded from the Analysis 
 
Average number 
of firms per 
cohort 
Average number 
of workers per 
cohort 
Firm averages 
Number of 
employees Wage rate, $ 
Hours 
per worker 
Age, 
years 
A. All single-location 
businesses in Seattle 
21,162 279,094 16.88 
(121.28) 
32.77 
(59.94) 
336.99 
(150.33) 
  
B. Firms with available 
revenue data 
14,358 231,684 19.30 
(105.07) 
29.80 
(45.91) 
339.39 
(140.64) 
11.18 
(9.63) 
C. B and firms with 5 and 
more employees 
6,347 204,159 33.85 
(143.78) 
28.92 
(21.83) 
356.19 
(119.80) 
12.57 
(10.34) 
D. C and firms in the 
analysis sample 
5,888 195,979 33.34 
(144.94) 
28.93 
(21.87) 
354.47 
(119.90) 
12.71 
(10.38) 
NOTES: Sample: Single-location businesses in Seattle. Agriculture, Mining, Utilities, Management of Companies and 
Enterprises, Educational Services, and Public Administration were excluded from the sample due to small sample sizes. Standard 
deviation reported in parentheses. 
SOURCE: UI records from Washington State, 2005–2016. 
 
 
                                                 
14 The state minimum wage is indexed to inflation annually on January 1. 
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Figure 1  Definition of Cohorts 
 
 
DESCRIPTIVE EVIDENCE 
Before evaluating the causal impact of the minimum wage on businesses, we examine the 
distribution of the costs of compliance across firms and demonstrate how the wage distribution 
changed after the minimum wage hikes. 
Businesses’ Exposure to the Minimum Wage Hike 
One of the key advantages of our data is that it allows us to observe the costs of compliance 
with the minimum wage for each firm. We measure the costs of compliance with the minimum 
wage hike, denoted by GAP, by calculating how much a business would need to increase its total 
wagebill to comply with the new minimum wage, if it kept the total number of hours worked the 
same as in the baseline period:15 
(1) 𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑐 =
∑ ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑚𝑎𝑥⁡{𝑀𝑊−⁡𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑐,0}𝑛
∑ ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑛
 
                                                 
15 This measure of the cost of compliance has been widely used in the literature (e.g., Draca, Machin, and 
Van Reenen, 2011; Hirsch, Kaufman, and Zelenska, 2015; Brummund, 2017), and was first introduced by Card and 
Krueger (1994). 
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where i denotes firms, c denotes a cohort, n denotes employees of the firm i, hinc denotes hours 
worked by worker n, winc denotes hourly wage rate paid to worker n, and MW is the minimum 
wage. A GAP of 1 percent means that a business needs to increase total labor costs by 1 percent 
to comply with the minimum wage. We calculate the costs of compliance at the baseline quarter 
for each cohort and do not update the costs of compliance as workforce composition changes. 
This allows us to interpret our estimates as an effect of a one percentage point increase in the 
costs of compliance. 
The Seattle Minimum Wage Ordinance establishes different minimum wage schedules for 
firms depending on their size and whether they contribute towards health benefits (see Table 1 for 
details). Unfortunately, we cannot determine the exact schedule that applies to each firm in our 
data because the City of Seattle counts firm size based on worldwide employees for all businesses 
in a chain or a network of franchises. We are able to compute the firm size in Washington, but we 
have no data on business affiliation and thus are unable to identify businesses belonging to 
networks of franchises or national branches. The second limitation of our data is that we cannot 
observe whether a job pays health benefits. We estimate the impact of the Seattle’s minimum wage 
by assigning all firms to the highest minimum wage schedule, which applies to businesses with 
501 or more employees worldwide that do not provide health benefits.16
 
Costs of compliance based 
on the highest minimum wage provide an upper bound estimate of the actual costs of compliance 
and will generally overestimate the true costs of compliance. By using this procedure, however, 
we will never incorrectly assume that businesses are not exposed to the minimum wage hike. 
To establish that GAP is a credible measure of the costs of compliance, we first examine 
changes in GAP over time. To do so, we update GAP every period as wages and hours worked 
                                                 
16 During the first phase-in period, the highest minimum wage was $11/hour; during the second phase-in, it 
was $13/hour. 
 12  
change at each firm, and compare it to GAP at the baseline. If GAP was closely related to the 
minimum wage, we would expect GAP to remain relatively stable in the years before Seattle 
Minimum Wage Ordinance. However, after it went into effect, we would expect companies to 
comply with the policy, in which case we would see GAP approach zero. This is, in fact, exactly 
what we see in our data (see Figure A.1). GAP exhibits small fluctuations over time in 2005–2013, 
but remains very stable. In 2015–2016 GAP declines sharply by 100–125 percent around the 
quarter when each minimum wage phase-in was implemented, which corresponds to paying all 
workers the minimum wage or more. 
 
Table 3. Costs of compliance with the minimum wage across firms. 
 $11 Minimum wage 
2014 cohort 
$13 Minimum wage 
2015 cohort 
Number of firms 6,327 6,577 
Exposed firms (GAP>0), % 39.4 51.06 
 
GAP among firms with GAP>0, % 
Mean 2.05 3.44 
Standard deviation 3.49 5.09 
25th percentile 0.08 0.24 
Median 0.47 1.15 
75th percentile 2.27 4.40 
NOTE: Sample: Surviving single-location firms that had five o r  more workers on 
payroll on average during the firm’s lifetime and have revenue data. GAP measures 
percentage increase in total wagebill required to meet the new minimum wage, 
assuming jobs and hours remain the same. 
SOURCE: UI records from WA state, 2005–2016. 
 
 
Table 3 shows the average costs of compliance in Seattle for both phase-in periods. At 
the time of the passage of the minimum wage ordinance in the second quarter of 2014, only 39 
percent of single-location businesses in Seattle had some workers who were paid less than $11 
per hour, and on average, exposed firms were required to increase labor costs by 2 percent. In the 
second quarter of 2015, before the implementation of the $13 minimum wage, the share of 
exposed firms was larger, 51 percent, and the average required increase in labor costs was 3.4 
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percent, but about half of the businesses were still not exposed to the minimum wage hike.17
 
However, the costs of compliance were unequally distributed even among exposed firms. In 
particular, half of the exposed firms needed to increase their labor costs by less than 1.5 percent 
to comply with both increases, while 25 percent of the exposed firms were required to raise their 
labor costs by 2.5 percent or more. 
Changes in the Distribution of Hours Worked in Low-wage Jobs 
We examine changes to the wage distribution to verify that the Seattle Minimum Wage 
Ordinance led to substantial changes in the labor market. Figure 2 shows the histogram of hours 
worked in Seattle at jobs paying less than $25 per hour before and after the minimum wage hike 
for both phase-in periods using 10-cent wage bins. The left panel compares the wage distribution 
in the second quarter of 2012 to the second quarter of 2013 (i.e., one year before the passage of 
the minimum wage ordinance). The center panel compares the wage distribution in the second 
quarter of 2014, when the ordinance was passed, with the wage distribution in the second quarter 
of 2015 (i.e., one year later) to demonstrate the effect of the $11 minimum wage, which went in 
effect on April 1, 2015. Finally, the right panel compares the wage distribution in the second 
quarter of 2015 to the second quarter of 2016 to demonstrate the effect of the $13 minimum 
wage, which went in effect on January 1, 2016. Both the center and the right panels of the Figure 
2 show that hours worked in jobs paying below the new minimum wage declined dramatically, 
indicating employers’ compliance with the minimum wage law. Furthermore, we see the large 
                                                 
17 This fact holds even in heavily exposed industries and cannot be explained by differences in pay between 
industries. Table A.1 breaks down exposure by industry. It demonstrates that, in the most affected industries—food 
and accommodation services and retail trade—27–40 percent and 10–20 percent of businesses, respectively, already 
paid their workers more than the new minimum wage before it was implemented. Limited-service restaurants were 
by far the most affected industry, with less than 10 percent of employers having zero costs of compliance and the 
average cost of compliance being 5–8 percent of the wagebill. 
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visible spikes in the wage distribution exactly at the level of the minimum wage schedules. We 
take this as the evidence of the quality of the data.18 
 
Figure 2  Histogram of Hours Worked in Low-wage Jobs in Seattle Before and After the Minimum Wage 
Hikes 
 
 
NOTE: Sample: Surviving single-location firms that had five o r  more workers on payroll on average during the firm’s lifetime 
and have revenue data. Wages have been adjusted for inflation using CPI-W. Dotted lines show the minimum wage schedules. 
The left panel (“Before Seattle Minimum Wage”) shows the placebo comparison where the gray area is the earlier date and the 
red is the later date. 
SOURCE: UI records from WA state, 2005–2016. 
 
Our examination of the histogram of hours worked does not, however, permit us to gage 
whether the total number of hours worked in low-wage jobs declined, grew, or remained the 
same. To shed light on the changes to total number of hours worked in low-wage jobs, Figure 3 
plots the cumulative distribution of hours worked at or below each wage level and shows the 
changes for the same time periods shown in Figure 2. Figure 3a shows hours worked in surviving 
businesses, defined as businesses that were listed as active in the DOR data both in the “pre” and 
“post” periods (e.g., the second quarter of 2012 and the second quarter of 2013 for the left 
panel). Figure 3b shows hours worked in exiting businesses (i.e., those that were active in the 
                                                 
18 The figure shows some jobs paying below the minimum wage. Some of these observations likely 
correspond to trainees, teenage workers, and workers with disability who are required to be paid at least 85 percent 
of the minimum wage. In addition, some of these observations occur due to the measurement error in hours worked. 
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“pre” period but closed by the “post” period) and in entering businesses (i.e. those that were 
inactive in the “pre” period but became active by the “post” period). The figure clearly shows 
that though the total number of hours worked in jobs paying less than $25 remained 
approximately the same in surviving businesses, but there were substantially fewer hours worked 
in jobs with lower wages. While we would expect the jobs paying less than the minimum wage 
(i.e., $11 or $13 per hour depending on the phase-in period) to become increasingly uncommon, 
the declines in hours worked propagate much farther than $11 or $13 per hour, respectively. 
These effects were absent in 2012–2013 and therefore were most likely associated with the 
minimum wage ordinance. This shift suggests that surviving businesses either upgraded wages of 
workers paid above the minimum wage as well to decompress the wage distribution, or they 
shifted away from less productive low-paid workers towards more productive workers that 
received higher wages. We will probe these two hypotheses in a later section, where we discuss 
the impact of the minimum wage on within-firm adjustments of surviving businesses.  
Figure 3b shows that entering businesses created more jobs than exiting businesses 
destroyed, clearly indicating that Seattle’s economy was growing from 2012 to 2016. After both 
minimum wage hikes, entering businesses mostly stopped adding jobs paying less than the 
highest minimum wage, again showing compliance with the city’s laws. However, after the hike 
to $13, entering businesses created fewer jobs paying up to $15 per hour than those that were 
destroyed by exiting businesses. Since the net growth in jobs paying less than $25 was still 
positive, this trend suggests that the minimum wage law did not slow down the rate of business 
entry, but it might have affected the type of business that was profitable despite higher labor  
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Figure 3  Cumulative Hours Worked in Low-wage Jobs in Seattle Before and After the Minimum Wage Hike 
(a) Surviving firms 
 
 
(b) Entering and exiting firms 
 
 
NOTE: Sample: Surviving single-location firms that had five o r  more workers on payroll on average during the firm’s lifetime 
and have revenue data. Wages have been adjusted for inflation using CPI-W. Dotted lines show the minimum wage schedules. 
The left panel (“Before Seattle Minimum Wage”) shows the placebo comparison where the gray area is the earlier date and the 
red is the later date. 
SOURCE: UI records from WA state, 2005–2016. 
 
 
costs. We will probe this hypothesis further when we study the causal impact of the minimum 
wage on business entry and exit in a later section. 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
Before we move to the empirical analysis, we outline the channels through which the 
minimum wage can impact firms’ revenue, wagebill, and labor demand. We can expect the 
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minimum wage to operate along the intensive and extensive margins. Intensive margin effects 
occur through within-firm adjustment in surviving firms, whereas extensive margin effects occur 
via business entry and exit, and via changes to the composition of surviving, entering, and 
existing businesses. To see how these effects propagate, consider the period-to-period growth 
rate in total hours worked, denoted by H. The percentage growth in hours worked, denoted by 
∆Ht/H0, can be decomposed into the following components: 
(2) 
𝛥𝐻𝑡
𝐻0
= 𝑟𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦
⏟
Entry
rate
𝜃ℎ
𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦
⏟
Type⁡of
entering
firm
+ (1 − 𝑟𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡)
⏟
Survival
rate
𝜃ℎ
𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑣
⏟
Type⁡of
surviving
firm
𝛥𝐻𝑡
𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑣/𝐻0
𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑣
⏟
Growth
in⁡surviving
firms
− 𝑟𝐸𝑥𝑖𝑡
⏟
Exit
rate
𝜃ℎ
𝐸𝑥𝑖𝑡
⏟
Type⁡of
exiting
firm
 
where 𝛥𝐻𝑡 = 𝐻𝑡 − 𝐻0 shows the change in hours worked in all businesses between period 0 and 
period 𝑡, 𝐻0 shows the number of hours worked in period 0, 𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 = 𝑁𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑁0⁄  is the entry rate 
relative to the number of businesses (N0) at the baseline, 𝑟𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡 = 𝑁𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡 𝑁0⁄  is the exit rate, and 
parameters 𝜃ℎ
𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑣, 𝜃ℎ
𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦
, and 𝜃ℎ
𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡 capture the composition of surviving, entering, and existing 
businesses, respectively. Each of these parameters is defined as the ratio of average hours (ℎ̅0
𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑣) 
at the baseline in the respective group (e.g., surviving businesses) to the average hours of all 
businesses (ℎ̅0) active at the baseline. For example, the type of surviving business, denoted by 
𝜃ℎ
𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑣, is defined as 𝜃ℎ
𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑣 = ℎ̅0
𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑣 ℎ̅0⁄ , where ℎ̅0 is the average number of hours in all active 
firms at the baseline, and ℎ̅0
𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑣 is the average number of hours at the baseline in businesses that 
survived through the last quarter in the cohort. The types of entering and existing firms, denoted 
by 𝜃ℎ
𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦
 and 𝜃ℎ
𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡 respectively, are defined similarly. This decomposition shows that the total 
effect of the minimum wage is a combination of the effects of each component of Equation 2. In 
the empirical part of the paper, we will analyze the effect on each component separately. The rest 
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of this section outlines the market forces that determine the magnitude of the intensive margin 
and extensive margin adjustments. 
At the intensive margin, the minimum wage raises the costs of employing low-paid labor 
to firms and increases firms’ marginal costs, but it can reduce turnover and help firms save on 
vacancy-filling costs. If the reduction in turnover is large enough, it can offset the increase in 
costs of labor. However, if the reduction in turnover is not large enough to prevent firms’ 
marginal costs from rising, a higher minimum wage will incentivize businesses to substitute 
away from low-paid labor to dampen the effect of the minimum wage on marginal costs, and to 
pass the remaining increase in marginal costs to consumers in the form of higher prices. 
We can think of the single-location businesses in Seattle as small firms selling 
heterogeneous goods and operating in a monopolistically competitive market, similar to the set-
up in Aaronson and French (2007) and Draca, Machin, and Van Reenen (2011). The quantity of 
the good each firm can sell is determined by the consumer demand qi = g(pi/Pj, Pj), where pi is 
the price charged by firm i, Pj is the overall price level in industry j, and qi is the quantity of the 
good sold by firm i. Then, the effect of the minimum wage on revenue can be written as follows: 
(3) 𝜀𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒 =
%𝛥𝑅
%𝛥𝑤
= (1 − 𝜂)𝜀𝑝 + (𝜂 − 𝜌)𝜀𝑃 
where η > 0 is the absolute value of the consumer demand elasticity with respect to own price, ρ 
is the absolute value of the consumer demand elasticity with respect to the market price, εp is the 
elasticity of own price with respect to average wage paid by the firm, and εP is the effect of the 
wage increase on the market price.19 
                                                 
19 We expect consumers to be more sensitive to the price of a particular firm rather than the price in the 
whole industry, so 𝜂 > 𝜌. 
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Equation 3 shows that a firm’s revenue can both increase or decrease following the 
minimum wage hike. If the consumer demand is elastic (i.e., η > 1), we would expect to see 
moderate decreases in revenue and large decreases in output if firms increase prices after a 
minimum wage hike. However, if the consumer demand is uni-elastic or inelastic (i.e., 𝜂 ≤ 1), 
raising prices will lead to increases in revenue. Moreover, if most firms in the industry are 
raising prices as well, the relative price of firm i will increase by less, and the decline in 
consumer demand will be smaller. 
The magnitude of the labor market adjustment is determined by the extent to which 
employers have to cut back on output because consumers are spending less on their products as a 
result of a price increase (scale effect), and by the degree to which low-wage jobs can be 
substituted by other inputs, such as high-wage jobs or non-labor inputs, as shown in Hamermesh 
(1993) and Aaronson and French (2007). Denote by L the number of hours worked in low-wage 
jobs, and by H the number of hours worked in high-wage jobs. Then, assuming that the 
production function has constant returns to scale and that the minimum wage does not affect 
wages of high-wage jobs, the elasticity of employment in each segment with respect to wages 
can be written as follows: 
(4) 𝜀𝐿 = 𝜃𝐿 − 𝜂𝜀𝑝 + (𝜂 − 𝜌)𝜀𝑃 −
𝑠𝐻
1−𝜋
𝜎𝐻𝐿 −
1−𝜋−𝑠
1−𝜋
𝜎𝐾𝐿 
(5) 𝜀𝐻 = 𝜃𝐻 − 𝜂𝜀𝑝 + (𝜂 − 𝜌)𝜀𝑃 +
𝑠𝐻
1−𝜋
𝜎𝐻𝐿 
where 𝑠𝐻 is the share of wagebill to high-wage jobs in revenue, s is the share of wagebill in 
revenue, π is the profit margin, −𝜎𝐻𝐿 < 0 is the elasticity of substitution between low-wage and 
high-wage jobs, −𝜎𝐾𝐿 < 0 is the elasticity of substitution between low-wage jobs and non-labor 
inputs, and 𝜃𝐿 and 𝜃𝐻 are the benefits from decreased turnover of low-wage and high-wage 
labor. 
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Finally, at the extensive margin, the increase in the minimum wage can lead to a change 
in the composition of firms. First, it can push less productive firms out of the market if the 
increase in marginal costs makes them unprofitable. Second, a minimum wage increases the 
marginal costs of all firms, including the marginal costs of new businesses. As a result, some 
businesses will find that it is no longer profitable to enter the market. Because the minimum 
wage raises the costs of low-wage jobs, we would expect that the marginal costs of labor-
intensive businesses would be particularly affected. Therefore, we can expect that the increases 
in the minimum wage might shift the composition of entering businesses towards less labor-
intensive businesses. 
EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 
In this section, we present our empirical strategy and discuss the assumptions required for 
identification. We study the effect of the minimum wage both at the intensive margin (i.e., to the 
wagebill and hours worked in surviving businesses) and at the extensive margin (i.e., to the rates 
of entry and exit and the composition of entering and exiting firms). We define surviving 
businesses as those that were active in the baseline quarter and remained open in the last quarter 
of each cohort, entering businesses as those that opened between the baseline quarter and the last 
quarter of the cohort, and exiting businesses as those that closed between the baseline quarter and 
the last quarter.20 
                                                 
20 Cohorts used to study the $11 minimum wage span six quarters, and cohorts used to study the $13 
minimum wage span five quarters. 
 
 21  
We start by studying the effect of the minimum wage hike on surviving firms. We are 
interested in effects on inflation-adjusted average hourly wage rate paid by each firm21, total 
wagebill, revenue, hours worked in all jobs, and hours worked in low-wage and high-wage jobs. 
We measure the growth rate in each outcome using a bounded measure of growth, which reduces 
the impact of outliers on the estimates:22 
(6) 𝛥𝑦𝑖𝑐𝑡 =
𝑦𝑖𝑐𝑡−𝑦𝑖𝑐𝑡0
0.5(𝑦𝑖𝑐𝑡+𝑦𝑖𝑐𝑡0)
 
 
where y is an outcome of interest, i denotes firm, c denotes cohort, t denotes the number of 
quarters after the baseline (we take the second quarter of each calendar year as the baseline 
quarter), and t0 denotes the baseline quarter. 
To study the impact of the exposure to the minimum wage on business outcomes, we 
compare change in outcomes in each firm in the treated cohort to firms with similar cost of 
compliance in the prior cohorts. We estimate the following difference-in-differences regression: 
(7) 𝛥𝑦𝑖𝑐𝑡 = 𝛼𝑡𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑐 + 𝛽𝑡𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑐𝑇𝑖𝑐 + 𝛾𝑡𝑋𝑖𝑐 + 𝜃𝑗𝑐𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑐𝑡 
where i denotes the individual firm, c is cohort, t denotes quarter, and j denotes industry (at the 
NAICS 4-digit level). Xic is a vector of controls, Tic is the indicator for the treated cohort, θjct is 
the industry-cohort-quarter fixed effect, µi is the firm fixed effect, and 𝜀𝑖𝑐𝑡 is the error term. For 
the treated cohort, 𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑐 shows the cost of compliance with the minimum wage. For control 
cohorts, 𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑐 shows the pseudo-costs of compliance, that is, the cost a business would have 
paid if the minimum wage was introduced in that cohort. Controlling for the pseudo-cost of 
compliance in the pre-policy period allows us to capture normal difference between high-paying 
                                                 
21 We express wage rates and earnings in constant prices of the second quarter of 2015 using the national 
CPI-W to match Washington’s laws on inflation adjustment of the state minimum wage. 
22 A bounded measure of growth is also convenient because it leads to a natural decomposition of the 
change in each outcome into contributions from separations, hires, and changes in continuing jobs. We explore this 
decomposition in detail when we analyze the labor market adjustment to the minimum wage. 
 22  
businesses, which would have had low costs of compliance, and low-paying businesses, which 
would have had high costs of compliance. Our coefficient of interest is 𝛽𝑡, which denotes the 
effect that a one percent increase in costs of compliance has on the outcomes of interest in the 
treated firms. 𝛼𝑡 shows the difference between low-paying and high-paying businesses in the 
pre-policy period, and 𝛾𝑡 shows the normal differential trends across small vs. large and young 
vs. old businesses. Since we are interested in the average effect of the minimum wage on 
businesses, we do not weight the regression in Equation 7 by firm size, forcing one observation 
to be a firm rather than a job. Finally, we cluster standard errors in all regressions by cohort and 
by industry (at the NAICS 3-digit level) to allow for common shocks and autocorrelation 
(Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan, 2004). 
We deal with the staggered nature of the minimum wage increase by estimating Equation 
7 separately for the minimum wage hike to $11 and to $13. To estimate the impact of the $11 
minimum wage, we compare firms that were active in the second quarter of 2014 to firms in the 
prior cohorts, and calculate costs of compliance using $11/hour as the new minimum wage for all 
cohorts. When we estimate the impact of the $13 minimum wage, we exclude the 2014 cohort 
from the sample, and compare firms which were active in the second quarter of 2015 to 2006–
2013 cohorts. As before, the pseudo-cost of compliance for the control cohorts is calculated 
using $13/hour. 
Because there are substantial differences in outcomes and in seasonal patterns across 
industries, we control for the cohort-quarter-industry fixed effect θjtq. Thus, we compare firms 
with different levels of exposure to the minimum wage within the same cohort, industry, and 
quarter since the baseline. We also include firm fixed effects µi to capture unobserved 
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heterogeneity across firms.23
 
Next, we allow for different seasonal patterns across small and large 
firms, and young and mature firms. To capture the differential seasonal effects, we control for 
the number of employees in a firm at the baseline (indicators for 1–4, 5–9, 10–49, 50–499, and 
500+ workers at baseline) and for the age of the firm (indicators for <1 year, 1–10, and >10 
years at baseline following the classification in Haltiwanger, Jarmin, and Miranda [2013]), and 
allow the coefficient γt to vary across quarters. 
The costs of compliance with the minimum wage are measured at the baseline quarter 
(i.e, at 𝑡 = 𝑡0) and are held constant for each firm for the subsequent six quarters, even if the 
workforce composition of the firm has changed. As a result, we can interpret the coefficient β as 
the impact of exposure to the minimum wage hike, where β =1 indicates that a one percentage 
point increase in costs of compliance with the minimum wage, measured by GAP, leads to a one 
percentage point increase in outcome y. 
Our difference-in-differences regression in Equation 7 estimates the difference between 
firms with positive costs of compliance and firms with zero costs of compliance in 2015–2016, 
when the Seattle Minimum Wage Ordinance was enacted, using the 2006–2013 cohorts as a 
comparison. Firms with zero compliance cost, which have been paying their workers more than 
the minimum wage even before it was enacted, help us identify trends that are common for all 
firms, such as changes in consumer demand and seasonality. It is especially important to control 
for such trends because our period of observation stretches through the Great Recession and 
contains post-recession years when Seattle’s economy was growing rapidly. To show that our 
estimates are unlikely to be driven by secular trends, we also estimate the effect of a placebo 
minimum wage ordinance passed in 2012 (i.e., two years before the actual passage of the Seattle 
                                                 
23 Fixed effect specification is estimated in Stata using a fast algorithm written and implemented by Correia 
(2016). 
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Minimum Wage Ordinance). We see no effect of the pseudo-ordinance on the wage rate and 
wagebill of the firms with a positive cost of compliance. Finally, we demonstrate that regression 
specifications that do not include data prior to the passage of the minimum wage or data for 
unexposed firms fail to pass falsification tests. 
 
Table 4  Balance Between Control and Treated Cohorts 
 Control cohorts 
(2005–2013) 
 
Treated cohort 
(2014 or 2015) 
Difference-in-
differences P-value 
GAP=0 GAP>0  GAP=0 GAP>0   
Panel A: 2014 Cohort, subject to $11 Minimum wage (MW) 
Cost of compliance (GAP), % 0.00 1.96  0.00 1.85 -0.107 0.059 
Number of workers 25.83 46.93  26.24 50.14 2.798 0.237 
Age, years 13.23 12.03  14.73 13.09 -0.442 0.070 
Average wage rate, $ (2015 prices) 34.7 19.5  34.9 19.5 -0.158 0.661 
Revenue per hour, $ (2015 prices) 238 96  215 92 18.642 0.120 
Wagebill over revenue, % 30.9 30.5  31.8 31.8 0.293 0.518 
Share of jobs paying <120% MW in hours, % 4.5 41.9  4.5 40.8 -1.056 0.077 
Share of jobs paying <125% MW in hours, % 5.9 45.2  5.7 43.8 -1.237 0.043 
Share of jobs paying <130% MW in hours, % 7.5 48.2  7.5 47.3 -0.904 0.152 
Exit rate 3.31 4.94  3.23 4.73 -0.131 0.778 
Entry rate 2.58  2.38 -0.199 0.481 
Observations 26,677 16,790  3,603 2,372   
Panel B: 2015 Cohort, subject to $13 Minimum wage 
Cost of compliance (GAP), % 0.00 5.07  0.00 3.19 -1.883 0.000 
Number of workers 23.36 42.16  27.49 47.50 1.252 0.634 
Age, years 13.19 12.36  15.09 13.25 -1.012 0.000 
Average wage rate, $ (2015 prices) 38.0 21.5  38.5 21.7 -0.397 0.472 
Revenue per hour, $ (2015 prices) 276 110  238 99 27.604 0.122 
Wagebill over revenue, % 31.1 30.6  31.6 31.7 0.702 0.144 
Share of jobs paying <120% MW in hours, % 5.2 46.8  6.1 47.2 -0.618 0.293 
Share of jobs paying <125% MW in hours, % 6.9 49.6  8.7 50.6 -0.753 0.220 
Share of jobs paying <130% MW in hours, % 9.0 52.5  10.5 53.3 -0.589 0.351 
Exit rate 3.03 4.48  3.19 5.77 1.134 0.013 
Entry rate 2.48  2.25 -0.225 0.504 
Observations 19,335 24,286  3,005 3,106   
NOTE: Sample: Single-location firms that had five of more workers on payroll on average during the firms’ lifetime and have 
revenue data. Agriculture, Mining, Utilities, Management of Companies and Enterprises, Educational Services, and Public 
Administration were excluded from the sample due to small sample sizes. GAP measures percentage increase in total wagebill 
required to comply with the new minimum wage, assuming jobs and hours remain the same. Differences-in-differences and P-
values show the difference in differences between exposed and non-exposed firms in treated and control cohorts. 
SOURCE: UI records from WA state, 2005-2016. 
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The key identifying assumption for the regression in Equation 7 requires that the 
difference in outcomes between employers with zero cost of compliance and employers with 
positive costs of compliance would have been the same in the 2014–2015 cohorts as in the 2006–
2013 cohorts after adjusting for the market-wide trends. Table 4 compares employers that were 
exposed to the minimum wage to employers that had no workers paid below the new minimum. 
As expected, firms exposed to the minimum wage had lower average hourly wages and lower 
revenue per hour. However, the treated low-paying firms were comparable to the low-paying 
firms in the control cohorts in size, age, and average wage rate, which suggests that our estimates 
should not be driven by a different composition of firms in 2015–2016 as compared to the earlier 
cohorts. 
After studying the effect of the minimum wage on surviving firms, we turn to the impact 
on business entry and exit. We estimate the effect of the minimum wage on the probability of 
exit in the same way as we estimate the impact of the minimum wage on surviving firms, except 
that we do not include firm fixed effects in these regressions. To trace the effects on business 
entry, we use the variation in exposure to the minimum wage across industries rather than across 
firms. For each NAICS 4-digit industry, we calculate the average costs of compliance GAPjc the 
same way we calculated the costs of compliance for each firm. Then, we regress the entry rate in 
each industry on the industry’s exposure to the minimum wage using the following difference-in-
differences specification: 
(8) 𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑗𝑐𝑡 = 𝛼𝑡𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑗𝑐 + 𝛽𝑡𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑗𝑐𝑇𝑗𝑐 + 𝜃𝑐𝑡 + 𝜀𝑗𝑐𝑡 
where⁡𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑗𝑐𝑡 = 𝑁𝑗𝑐𝑡
𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑁𝑗𝑐0⁄ ⁡is the ratio of the number of businesses in industry j that entered 
between period 0 and period t to the number of businesses in that industry in the baseline 
quarter. 
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Finally, we also investigate the minimum wage effects on the type of entering and exiting 
businesses by comparing mean outcomes in those firms to mean outcomes of all active 
businesses at the baseline. For example, the dependent variable for exiting firms in this 
regression is defined as 𝑦𝑖
𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡 ?̅?0⁄ , where 𝑦
𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡 is the outcome at the baseline of business i that 
closed before the last quarter of the cohort, and ?̅?0 is the mean outcome among all businesses 
that were active in the baseline quarter of the cohort. Then we estimate the effect of the 
minimum wage on the composition of existing firms using the baseline specification (Eq. 7). The 
outcome of this regression shows whether exiting firms had unusually high hours, wagebills, and 
revenue after the minimum hike as compared to the exiting firms in 2005–2013. We run a similar 
regression for entering firms using the regression specification in Equation 8. 
WITHIN-FIRM ADJUSTMENT OF SURVIVING BUSINESSES 
Impact on Wages 
We start by examining the effect of the minimum wage on the average wage rates paid by 
a firm, estimated using Equation 7. The goal of this analysis is to establish that our data and our 
identification strategy capture the direct, intended effect of the minimum wage—the increase in 
wages. 
We define an hourly wage rate as the average hourly compensation paid by the firm i, 
calculated as the quarterly wagebill divided by quarterly hours worked. Tables 5 and 6 show the 
estimated results for the $11 and $13 wage rates, respectively. We test four specifications. First, 
we estimate the effect on the sample of the treated businesses using only the treated cohorts, that 
is, businesses that were active in the baseline quarter and had positive costs of compliance with 
the minimum wage (column 1). Second, we estimate the effect on the sample of the treated  
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Table 5  Effect of the $11 Minimum Wage on Average Wages 
 
Treatment Placebo 
(1) (2) (3) (4) a (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Treated 
cohort 
GAP>0 
Treated 
cohort 
All firms 
All 
cohorts 
All firms 
All 
cohorts 
All firms 
Pseudo 
Treated 
cohort 
GAP>0 
Pseudo 
Treated 
cohort 
All firms 
All 
cohorts 
All firms 
All 
cohorts 
All firms 
Panel A: Timing of the effect 
GAP × t = −3 0.00 0.12∗∗∗ -0.59∗∗∗ -0.39∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗ 0.34∗∗∗  -0.18∗∗∗ 0.06 
 (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) 
GAP × t = −2 -0.13∗ -0.28∗∗∗ -0.45∗∗∗ -0.25∗∗∗ 0.01 -0.15∗∗ -0.19∗∗∗ 0.04 
 (0.08) (0.07) -(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) 
GAP × t = −1 0.18∗∗ 0.11 -0.25∗∗∗ -0.04 0.3∗∗∗ 0.38∗∗∗  -0.17∗∗ 0.07 
 (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) 
GAP × t = 0 0.97∗∗∗ 1.10∗∗∗ 0.49∗∗∗ 0.69∗∗∗ 0.42∗∗∗ 0.58∗∗∗  -0.14 0.10 
 (0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) 
GAP × t = 1 1.10∗∗∗ 1.20∗∗∗ 0.67∗∗∗ 0.87∗∗∗ 0.45∗∗∗ 0.60∗∗∗ -0.13 0.11 
 (0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
GAP × t = 2 0.81∗∗∗ 0.70∗∗∗ 0.73∗∗∗ 0.93∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗ 0.10 -0.07 0.17∗ 
  (0.11) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) 
Obs 13,242 33,846 276,161 276,161 13,757 33,072 208,751 208,751 
R2 0.09 0.06 0.06 0.24 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.20 
Panel B: Average effect 
GAP × t ≥ 0 0.95∗∗∗ 1.00∗∗∗ 0.69∗∗∗ 0.89∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗ -0.08 0.11 
  (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) 
Obs 13,242 33,846 276,161 276,161 13,487 33,072 208,751 208,751 
R2 0.09 0.06 0.06 0.24 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.26 
Year-quarter-
industry FE 
  X X   X X 
Firm FE       X       X 
NOTE: ***p< 0.001, **p< 0.01, *p< 0.05. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by the industry 
(NAICS 3-digit sector) and cohort (if more than one cohort). Sample: Surviving single-location firms that had five o r  more workers 
on payroll on average during the firm’s lifetime and have revenue data. All regressions include controls for firm size at baseline 
and firm age. GAP measures the percentage increase in total wagebill required to comply with the new minimum wage, assuming 
jobs and hours remain the same. 
a Columns 3, 4, 7, and 8 include cohort-quarter-industry fixed effects (FE) from 2005–2016; columns 4 and 8 also include firm 
FEs. 
SOURCE: UI records from WA state, 2005–2016. 
 
 
cohorts on all of the cohorts; that is, we include businesses with both with zero and positive costs 
of compliance. Finally, we run the model on the sample of all businesses in the data from 2005 to 
2016, and include cohort-industry-quarter fixed effects (column 3) and cohort-industry-quarter 
fixed effects and firm fixed effects (column 4). We also show the results of the falsification tests 
in columns (5) to (8) for the same respective categories to demonstrate that our results are 
unlikely to be driven by changes in Seattle’s economy that occurred at the same time as the  
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Table 6  Effect of the $13 Minimum Wage on Average Wages 
 
Treatment Placebo 
(1) (2) (3) (4) a (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Treated 
cohort 
GAP>0 
Treated 
cohort 
All firms 
All 
cohorts 
All firms 
All 
cohorts 
All firms 
Pseudo- 
treated 
cohort 
GAP>0 
Pseudo- 
treated 
cohort 
All firms 
All 
cohorts 
All firms 
All 
cohorts 
All firms 
Panel A: Timing of the effect 
GAP × t = −2 0.13∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗ -0.09∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗  -0.06∗∗ 0.02 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
GAP × t = −1 0.01 −0.11∗∗ -0.21∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗ -0.03 -0.062∗∗ -0.06∗∗ 0.02 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
GAP × t = 0 0.52∗∗∗ 0.50∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗∗ 0.72∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗ -0.05 0.03 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.06) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
GAP × t = 1 0.56∗∗∗ 0.66∗∗∗ 0.45∗∗∗ 0.80∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗ -0.027 0.05∗ 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
GAP × t = 2 0.58∗∗∗ 0.66∗∗∗ 0.50∗∗∗ 0.85∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗∗ -0.01 0.07∗∗ 
  (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Obs 14,685 29,235 235,325 235,325 16,255 28,150 177,690 177,690 
R2 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.22 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.24 
Panel B: Average effect 
GAP × t < 0 0.07∗ 0.04 −0.15∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗ 0.044∗ 0.045∗∗ −0.062∗∗ 0.02 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
GAP × t ≥ 0 0.55∗∗∗ 0.61∗∗∗ 0.44∗∗∗ 0.79∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗ −0.026 0.053∗ 
  (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.06) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Obs 14,685 29,235 235,325 235,325 16,255 28,150 177,690 177,690 
R2 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.22 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.24 
Year-quarter-
industry FE 
  X X   X X 
Firm FE    X    X 
NOTE: ***p< 0.001, **p< 0.01, *p< 0.05. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by the industry 
(NAICS 3-digit sector) and cohort (if more than one cohort). Sample: Surviving single-location firms that had five o r  more workers 
on payroll on average during the firm’s lifetime and have revenue data. All regressions include controls for firm size at baseline 
and firm age. GAP measures the percentage increase in total wagebill required to comply with the new minimum wage, assuming 
jobs and hours remain the same. 
a Columns 3, 4, 7, and 8 include cohort-quarter-industry fixed effects (FE) from 2005–2016; columns 4 and 8 also include firm 
FEs. 
SOURCE: UI records from WA state, 2005–2016. 
 
 
minimum wage hike. The falsification test re-estimates the model assuming that the minimum 
wage ordinance was passed in 2012 rather than in 2014. 
All specifications show that the minimum wage had a strong positive effect on wages 
after t = 0 during both the first and the second phase-in periods, where t = 0 denotes the first 
period in which the minimum wage was raised. However, specifications that include only treated 
cohorts yield a larger effect as compared to the specifications that include all years of data. 
Falsification tests reveal that the larger estimates can be explained by the fact that businesses 
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with high costs of compliance, which are also the low-paying businesses, saw faster wage growth 
in the pre-policy period. Both specifications based on the sample only from the treated cohorts 
yield estimates of the pseudo-minimum wage effect that are half as large as the effect observed 
in 2015–2016 when the ordinance was actually implemented. Because the specifications based 
on the treated cohort fail the falsification test, we will focus on the specifications that include all 
years of the data for the remainder of the paper. Our preferred specifications, which use the data 
from all cohorts and include cohort-quarter-industry fixed effects (at the NAICS 4-digit level), 
are presented in columns (3) and (4), perform reasonably well in the falsification test. However, 
specification without firm fixed effects shows a small negative and statistically significant effect 
of the pseudo-minimum wage in some periods, which warrants caution in interpretation. In the 
rest of the paper, we report both of these specifications along with the falsification test for each 
outcome in question. 
Our preferred specifications show that the $11 minimum wage had no anticipatory effect 
on wages in Seattle. In fact, the estimates suggest a slowdown in wage growth right before the 
minimum wage increase. Next, we see wage increases that begin before 𝑡 = 0 during the phase-
in of the $13 minimum wage and much larger coefficients in the quarters following the second 
wage hike. This is expected, because periods 𝑡 = −2 and 𝑡 = −1 for the second wage hike 
correspond to the period when the $11 minimum wage was already implemented. 
Overall, our results show that a 1 percent average cost of compliance led to an additional 
0.80 percentage point increase in average wages after the phase-in of the $11 minimum wage and 
to an additional 0.61 percentage point increase in average wages after the phase-in of the $13 
minimum wage. Overall, the $11 minimum wage increased wages in all surviving firms by 0.64 
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percent (i.e., 0.80 multiplied by the average GAP of 2.05 percent and by the share of exposed 
firms, 0.39) and the $13 minimum wage increased wages in all surviving firms by 1.07 percent. 
Tables A.2 and A.3 present the effect of the minimum wage on total wagebill using the 
same regression specifications. The results show very similar patterns as the effect of the 
minimum wage on the average wage. The estimates demonstrate that there was no anticipatory 
effect before the minimum wage went in effect and that our preferred regression specifications 
pass the falsification test. However, just like in the case of the effect of the minimum wage on 
wages, we see auto-correlation in the wagebill, and it is stronger if we do not include firm fixed 
effects in our regressions. 
Finally, we see that the magnitude of the effect on the wagebill was commensurate with 
the magnitude of the effect on wages. In 2015 a 1 percent cost of compliance led to a 0.94 
percentage point increase in the wagebill. In 2016, a 1 percent cost of compliance led to a 0.73 
increase. These numbers show that employers generally saw an increase in the wagebill that was 
just as large as the increase in wages, suggesting at most a mild disemployment effect in 
surviving firms. We turn to the detailed analysis of labor market and product market adjustments 
of surviving firms in the next two subsections. 
Labor Market Adjustment 
In the previous section, we show that the wagebill of surviving firms increased by almost 
as much or slightly more than the average wages. In this section, we turn to the labor market 
adjustment to the minimum wage and investigate how the minimum wage has affected hours 
worked, workforce composition, and within-firm wage distribution. 
We start by examining the effect of the minimum wage on hours. The minimum wage 
makes an hour of work in low-wage jobs more expensive to employers, and thus we would 
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expect the effects of the ordinance to be especially pronounced in this labor market segment. To 
understand the effects of the minimum wage on low-wage jobs, we decompose the growth in 
total hours worked into the growth due to changes in low-wage and high-wage jobs. To do so, 
we express the growth in total hours between periods 0 and t, denoted by 𝑁𝐸𝐺0,𝑡, in terms of the 
contribution of low-paying jobs and high-paying jobs: 
(9) 𝑁𝐸𝐺0,𝑡 =
ℎ𝑡−ℎ0
0.5(ℎ0+ℎ𝑡)
=
ℎ𝑡(𝑤𝑡<?̅?)−ℎ0(𝑤0<?̅?)
0.5(ℎ0+ℎ𝑡)
⏟
+
Contribution⁡of⁡jobs⁡paying<?̅?
ℎ𝑡(𝑤≥?̅?)−ℎ0(𝑤0≥?̅?)
0.5(ℎ0+ℎ𝑡)
⏟
Contribution⁡of⁡jobs⁡paying≥?̅?
 
where ℎ𝑡 denotes hours worked in all jobs in period 𝑡, and ℎ𝑡(𝑤𝑡 < ?̅?) denotes hours worked in 
period t in jobs paying less than ?̅? in period t. ?̅? is an arbitrary threshold wage rate, and any 
wage less than the threshold is considered low paying and any wage greater is considered high 
paying. 
Generally, we expect that there are two conflating effects of the minimum wage on low-
wage jobs. First, the ripple effect of the minimum wage on higher-paying jobs, which has been 
well documented in the past (Neumark, Schweitzer, and Wascher, 2004; Autor, Manning, and 
Smith, 2016; Phelan, 2019), can manifest itself as declines in low-wage jobs because employers 
are raising wages of those workers, rather than due to declines in labor demand. Second, low-
wage jobs are likely held by lower skilled or less experienced workers, so employers can 
substitute away from these workers through changes in the workforce composition or 
automation. 
To separate the ripple effects of the minimum wage from the reduction in labor demand, 
we further decompose the growth in low-wage jobs into two components, as illustrated in Figure 
4. First, we isolate the changes in low-wage jobs that arise because a job crosses the threshold ?̅? 
and is no longer counted towards hours of jobs paying less than ?̅?. This would happen if 
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employers upgraded wages of jobs that used to pay less than ?̅? to wages above ?̅?. Similarly, 
some jobs that used to pay wages above ?̅? could have received a wage cut and started to pay 
below ?̅?. We would expect these changes to reflect the ripple effects of the minimum wage 
rather than changes in labor demand. Second, we isolate the changes in low-wage jobs that are 
unrelated to wage upgrades above ?̅? or downgrades below ?̅?. Such changes can occur because 
of hires into low-wage jobs, separations from low-wage jobs, or because of the changes in hours 
worked in jobs that pay less than ?̅?. 
 
Figure 4  Channels of Adjustment in Hours of Low-wage Jobs in Periods 0 and t1 
 
 
Formally, we define the changes in hours due to wage upgrading or downgrading and changes in 
hours unrelated to wage upgrading or downgrading as follows: 
(10) 𝛥ℎ(Ripple⁡effect)0,𝑡 = −ℎ0(𝑤0 < ?̅?,𝑤𝑡 ≥ ?̅?) + ℎ𝑡(𝑤0 ≤ ?̅?,𝑤𝑡 > ?̅?) 
(11) 𝛥ℎ(Labor⁡demand⁡effect)0,𝑡 = −𝑆𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠0,𝑡 + 𝐻𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑠0,𝑡+Δh(𝑤0 < ?̅?, 𝑤𝑡 < ?̅?) 
The contribution of separations is calculated as 𝑆𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠0,𝑡 = ℎ0(𝑤0 < ?̅?) for jobs 
that were active in period 0 but ended before period 𝑡. The contribution of hires is calculated as 
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𝐻𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑠0,𝑡 = ℎ𝑡(𝑤𝑡 < ?̅?)for jobs that started since period 0 and existed in period 𝑡. The 
contribution of the changes in continuing jobs is calculated as 𝛥ℎ(𝑤0 < ?̅?,𝑤𝑡 < ?̅?)0,𝑡 =
ℎ𝑡(𝑤0 < ?̅?, 𝑤𝑡 < ?̅?) − ℎ0(𝑤0 < ?̅?,𝑤𝑡 < ?̅?) for jobs that existed both in periods 0 and 𝑡. 
We estimate the ripple effect of the minimum wage using the same regression 
specifications as before (i.e., Eq. 7). We experiment with different levels of ?̅? to define the low-
wage labor market segment, varying ?̅? from 105 percent to 150 percent of the minimum wage.24
 
The goal is to find a wage threshold ?̅?⁡at which the ripple effect of the minimum wage is no 
longer present. 
The results of this exercise are presented in Figure 5. We see strong evidence of the 
ripple effect during both phase-in periods; that is, a significant fraction of declines in low-wage 
jobs occurred because some low-wage jobs received wage upgrades. As we increase the wage 
threshold, the magnitude of reduction in hours due to wage upgrading diminishes, consistent 
with the intuition that the ripple effect tapers off. Our estimates show that Seattle’s minimum 
wage had ripple effects on higher paying jobs up to the level of 120–130 percent of the minimum 
wage, similar to the extent of the ripple effect found in previous studies (Neumark, Schweitzer, 
and Wascher, 2004; Autor, Manning, and Smith, 2016; Phelan, 2019). This threshold 
corresponds to $13.20–$14.50 per hour for the $11 minimum wage and to $15.60–$16.25 per 
hour for the $13 minimum wage. Moreover, our findings on the extent of the ripple effect are 
also consistent with employer-reported adjustments to the minimum wage in Seattle documented 
in Romich et al. (2019). Among the respondents in the Survey of Seattle’s Employers, 50 percent 
of businesses said that they raised employees’ pay to decompress wages in the range of $13–
                                                 
24 For the first phase-in period, these thresholds correspond to the wage rates from $11.55 to $16.50. For 
the second phase-in period, these thresholds correspond to the wage rates from $13.65 to $19.50. 
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$15/hour, and 30 percent of businesses said that they raised pay of employees in the range of 
$15/hour and higher. 
 
Figure 5  Ripple Effect of the Minimum Wage on Jobs Paying Above the Minimum Wage 
 
NOTE: Sample: Surviving single-location firms that had five o r  more workers on payroll on average during the firm’s lifetime 
and have revenue data. Ripple effect of the minimum wage is measured by changes in hours of low-wage jobs due to wage 
upgrading rather than due to hires, separations, or changes in hours without changes to wage rate. See text for details.  
SOURCE: UI records from WA state, 2005–2016. 
 
 
Having established that the ripple effect of the minimum wage extended through 120–130 
percent of the minimum wage, we now turn to the analysis of the changes in labor demand. We 
report the impact of the minimum wage on the growth in hours worked in all jobs, low-wage 
jobs, and high-wage jobs along the lines of the decomposition (Eq. 9). We define the low-wage 
labor market segment as jobs paying below 120–130 percent of the minimum wage to ensure that 
our estimates are not driven by the ripple effect of the minimum wage. Table 7 presents our 
results.
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Table 7  Effect of the Minimum Wage on Labor Costs and Hours Worked in Low-wage and High-wage Jobs in Surviving Firms 
 $11 Minimum wage  $13 Minimum wage 
Treatment Placebo Treatment Placebo 
(1) 
All 
cohorts 
All firms 
(2) 
All 
cohorts 
All firms 
(3) 
All 
cohorts 
All firms 
(4) 
All 
cohorts 
All firms 
(5) 
All 
cohorts 
All firms 
(6) 
All 
cohorts 
All firms 
(7) 
All 
cohorts 
All firms 
(8) 
All 
cohorts 
All firms 
%∆Average wage rate 0.69*** 0.89*** -0.08 0.11  0.44*** 0.79*** -0.03 0.05* 
 (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.04) (0.06) (0.03) (0.03) 
%∆Labor costs 0.88*** 1.00*** 0.6*** 0.6*** 0.49*** 0.96*** 0.18** 0.19** 
 (0.20) (0.17) (0.23) (0.18) (0.13) (0.13) (0.09) (0.09) 
%∆Total hours 0.19 0.17 0.68*** 0.5*** 0.08 0.21 0.21** 0.14 
 (0.19) (0.16) (0.22) (0.18) (0.13) (0.14) (0.09) (0.09) 
Contribution to %∆Total hours of: 
Jobs paying < 120% of MW -0.14 -0.61*** 0.77*** 0.12  0.12 -0.29** 0.24*** -0.039 
 (0.19) (0.19) (0.20) (0.18) (0.12) (0.14) (0.08) (0.08) 
Jobs paying < 125% of MW -0.05 -0.49*** 0.74*** 0.11 0.22* -0.16 0.23*** -0.029 
 (0.19) (0.18) (0.20) (0.18) (0.12) (0.14) (0.09) (0.08) 
Jobs paying < 130% of MW 0.072 -0.34* 0.73*** 0.15 0.22* -0.13 0.22** -0.033 
 (0.19) (0.18) (0.20) (0.18) (0.12) (0.14) (0.09) (0.08) 
Obs 276,161 276,161 177,690 177,690   
 
 235,325 235,325 177,690 177,690 
Year-quarter-industry FE X X X X X X X X 
Firm FE  X  X  X  X 
NOTE: ***p< 0.001, **p< 0.01, *p< 0.05. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by industry (NAICS 3-digit sector) and cohort. Sample: Surviving 
single-location firms that had five or more workers on payroll on average during the firms’ lifetime and have revenue data. All regressions include controls for firm size at the 
baseline and for firm age. GAP measures percentage increase in the total wagebill required to comply with the new minimum wage, assuming jobs and hours remain the same.  
SOURCE: UI records from WA state, 2005-2016. 
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First, both minimum wage phase-in periods had no impact on total hours, because the 
coefficient for the effect of the cost of compliance on total hours is not statistically different from 
zero. This result is consistent with the fact that higher wages translated into one-to-one increases 
in labor costs in surviving firms, and suggests that the minimum wage in Seattle did not lead to a 
distinguishable scale effect among surviving firms. The scale effect would be generated if 
employers passed the increased in the minimum wage to prices. Therefore, the absence of the 
scale effect indicates that there was no substantial price increases in Seattle as a result of the 
minimum wage, which we will confirm in the analysis of the product market adjustment to the 
minimum wage. 
Next, our estimates paint a mixed picture on the magnitude of the substitution effect. The 
specification that does not include firm fixed effects shows that the minimum wage did not lead 
to a disemployment effect in low-wage jobs either after the implementation of the $11 or the $13 
minimum wage, because the estimated impact is not statistically different from zero. However, 
the specification that includes firm fixed effects shows that employment in low-wage jobs 
declined after both minimum wage phase-in periods. The negative impact of the $11 minimum 
wage was observed for jobs paying less than 130 percent of the minimum wage, or $13.20, and 
the negative impact of the $13 minimum wage was observed for jobs paying less than 120 
percent of the minimum wage, or $15.60. To understand the magnitudes of these effects, we 
convert our estimates into employment elasticity using the following relationship: 
𝜀𝐸 =
1
𝛽𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑠
𝛽Jobs⁡paying<?̅?
Share⁡of⁡jobs⁡paying < 𝑤
¯
in⁡total⁡hours
 
 
The estimates of the employment elasticity are presented in Table 8. The elasticity 
estimate can be interpreted as a percentage change in hours of low-wage jobs in response to a 1 
 37 
percent increase in average wages, induced by the minimum wage increase. We find that 
employment elasticity for jobs paying less than $13.20 was at most –0.8, and for jobs paying less 
than $15.50, it was at most –0.3. These estimates for employment elasticity imply that the $11 
minimum wage led to a 1.1 percent decrease in jobs paying less than $13.20 and the $13 
minimum wage led to a 0.7 percent decline in jobs paying less than $15.60 in surviving firms. 
 
Table 8  Employment Elasticity Implied by the Estimates 
 
Employment 
elasticity 
Wage increase in 
exposed firms, % 
Employment 
effect on low-
wage jobs in 
exposed firms, % 
Share of low-
wage jobs 
provided by 
exposed firms 
Employment 
effect on all low-
wage jobs, % 
Panel A. $11 Minimum wage (MW) 
Jobs paying <120% of MW -1.68 1.82 -3.06 0.85 -2.62 
Jobs paying <125% of MW -1.26 1.82 -2.29 0.83 -1.91 
Jobs paying <130% of MW -0.81 1.82 -1.47 0.80 -1.18 
Panel B. $13 Minimum wage 
Jobs paying <120% of MW -0.78 2.72 -2.11 0.89 -1.88 
Jobs paying <125% of MW -0.40 2.72 -1.09 0.86 -0.93 
Jobs paying <130% of MW -0.31 2.72 -0.84 0.84 -0.71 
 
Our previous findings on the impacts of the Seattle minimum wage (Jardim et al., 2017a) 
suggest that aggregate employment elasticity in Seattle was of the order of –1 to –2, which is 
about twice as large as the employment elasticity that we estimated for surviving firms. What can 
explain this difference? As we discussed in previously, employers would not need to substitute 
away from low-wage jobs if the increases in the wagebill were offset by lower turnover that 
results in savings on replacement costs. In another paper examining workers’ employment 
trajectories after the minimum wage increase in Seattle, we find that the minimum wage reduced 
turnover by 8 percent (Jardim et al., 2018). This evidence indicates that the turnover channel 
most likely played a substantial role in mitigating the consequences of the minimum wage in 
Seattle for surviving firms. The second explanation for the differences in effects to surviving 
firms vs. effects to the aggregate labor market likely stems from the magnitudes of the effects on 
the intensive vs. extensive margins. In particular, if the technology of production is associated 
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with a fixed capital-to-labor ratio and technological changes are very costly, most of the 
adjustment would arise through business entry and exit (Aaronson et al., 2018). Moreover, new 
businesses cannot take advantage of reduced turnover, because they have to hire new workers. 
We will examine this hypothesis explicitly when we study the extensive margin effects of the 
minimum wage. 
Product Market Adjustment 
In this section, we examine the product market adjustment to the minimum wage. In the 
conceptual framework section, we have shown that the impact of the minimum wage on revenue 
is driven by two parameters: the extent to which the minimum wage increases firm’s marginal 
costs, which determines the increase in prices, and the elasticity of consumer demand, which 
determines the changes to output. In our data, we do not observe prices directly, but we examine 
changes to revenue and hours worked instead. 
Table 9 presents our results. We decompose changes in revenue into changes in hours 
worked and changes in revenue per hour. If employers are increasing prices, we would expect 
the effect of the minimum wage on revenue per hour to be positive. However, all regression 
specifications show that the minimum wage had no impact on revenue per hour of surviving 
firms. The evidence on the impact of the minimum wage on revenue is more mixed. Consistent 
with no price effect, we see no effect of the minimum wage on revenue following the $11 
minimum wage hike. However, there is some evidence that surviving firms might have raised 
prices in response to the $13 minimum wage. The specification with firm fixed effects suggests 
that a 1 percent cost of compliance led to a 0.2 percent increase in revenue of surviving firms, 
while the specification without firm fixed effects finds an effect of 0.05, which is not statistically 
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Table 9  Effect of the Minimum Wage on Revenue, Hours Worked, and Revenue Labor Productivity of Surviving Firms 
 $11 Minimum wage   $13 Minimum wage 
Treatment Placebo Treatment Placebo 
(1) 
All 
cohorts 
All firms 
(2) 
All 
cohorts 
All firms 
(3) 
All 
cohorts 
All firms 
(4) 
All 
cohorts 
All firms 
(5) 
All 
cohorts 
All firms 
(6) 
All 
cohorts 
All firms 
(7) 
All 
cohorts 
All firms 
(8) 
All 
cohorts 
All firms 
%∆Average wage rate 0.69*** 0.89*** -0.08 0.11  0.44*** 0.79*** -0.03 0.053* 
 (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07)  (0.04) (0.06) (0.03) (0.03) 
%∆Revenue 0.11 0.11 0.081 0.12  0.047 0.23** 0.034 0.057 
 (0.16) (0.14) (0.18) (0.14)  (0.11) (0.12) (0.07) (0.07) 
%∆Revenue per hour -0.043 -0.047 -0.64*** -0.41**  -0.074 -0.01 -0.19** -0.088 
 (0.18) (0.16) (0.18) (0.17)  (0.12) (0.13) (0.08) (0.08) 
%∆Total hours 0.19 0.17 0.68*** 0.50***  0.076 0.21 0.21** 0.14 
 (0.19) (0.16) (0.22) (0.18)  (0.13) (0.14) (0.09) (0.09) 
Obs 276,161 276,161 208,751 208,751  235,325 235,325 177,690 177,690 
Year-quarter-industry FE X X X X  X X X X 
Firm FE  X  X   X  X 
NOTE: ***p< 0.001, **p< 0.01, *p< 0.05. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by industry (NAICS 3-digit sector) and cohort. Sample: Surviving 
single-location firms that had five or more workers on payroll on average during the firms’ lifetime and have revenue data. All regressions include controls for firm size at the 
baseline and for firm age. GAP measures percentage increase in the total wagebill required to comply with the new minimum wage, assuming jobs and hours remain the same.  
SOURCE: UI records from WA state, 2005-2016. 
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different from zero. Overall, our results show no effect or a minimal effect of the minimum wage 
to the product market in Seattle. 
We also estimate the impact of the minimum wage on prices directly for a small subset of 
restaurants, retailers, and service businesses in Seattle for whom the data on prices were 
collected online and offline.25
 
Because of the timing of the data collection, we have information 
on the price changes in response to the $13 minimum wage, but not to the $11 minimum wage. 
After merging the data on prices to our main analysis sample, we have 45 employers for whom 
we observe prices, wages, and revenue. Table A.4 presents the results of a simple linear 
regression, where the dependent variables are changes in prices and wages, and the independent 
variable is the cost of compliance interacted with the time period. Due to the small number of 
observations, we do not include any other controls in this regression. Because multiple item 
prices were collected for some businesses, we have calculated a simple average of the price 
change across items for such businesses, and ran two regression specifications—column (1) of 
Table A.4 shows the results of an unweighted specification, while column (2) shows the results 
of the specification weighted with the number of items. Despite the small number of 
observations, all specifications demonstrate a strong correlation between the cost of compliance 
and the growth in average wage rate. However, prices are positively correlated with the costs of 
compliance only in the second quarter of 2016, but not in the first quarter of 2016, and the 
coefficient is not statistically significant in either period. 
Taken together, our results do not provide a clear indication of price increases in 
surviving firms in response to the minimum wage. Aaronson, French, and MacDonald (2008) 
                                                 
25 The data was collected on foot and by scraping prices for restaurants from the delivery web-service 
GrubHub.com. For each business, one item was picked for on-foot price collection, and 10 items were scraped from 
the online menus. The data collection started in the second quarter of 2015, when the minimum wage went up to 
$11/hour, and continued until the second quarter of 2016. 
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demonstrated that a strong price effect of the minimum wage is always accompanied by a 
disemployment effect, as both of these changes are associated with an increase in firms’ 
marginal costs. The lack of a strong disemployment effect in surviving firms in Seattle and 
mixed evidence on the price adjustment suggests that the minimum wage in Seattle had only a 
mild impact on the marginal costs of surviving firms. 
We also estimate the impact of the minimum wage on prices directly for a small subset of 
restaurants, retailers, and service businesses in Seattle for whom the data on prices were 
collected online and offline.26
 
Because of the timing of the data collection, we have information 
on the price changes in response to the $13 minimum wage, but not to the $11 minimum wage. 
After merging the data on prices to our main analysis sample, we have 45 employers for whom 
we observe prices, wages, and revenue. Table A.4 presents the results of a simple linear 
regression, where the dependent variables are changes in prices and wages, and the independent 
variable is the cost of compliance interacted with the time period. Due to the small number of 
observations, we do not include any other controls in this regression. Because multiple item 
prices were collected for some businesses, we have calculated a simple average of the price 
change across items for such businesses, and ran two regression specifications—column (1) of 
Table A.4 shows the results of an unweighted specification, while column (2) shows the results 
of the specification weighted with the number of items. Despite the small number of 
observations, all specifications demonstrate a strong correlation between the cost of compliance 
and the growth in average wage rate. However, prices are positively correlated with the costs of 
                                                 
26 The data was collected on foot and by scraping prices for restaurants from the delivery web-service 
GrubHub.com. For each business, one item was picked for on-foot price collection, and 10 items were scraped from 
the online menus. The data collection started in the second quarter of 2015, when the minimum wage went up to 
$11/hour, and continued until the second quarter of 2016. 
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compliance only in the second quarter of 2016, but not in the first quarter of 2016, and the 
coefficient is not statistically significant in either period. 
Taken together, our results do not provide a clear indication of price increases in 
surviving firms in response to the minimum wage. Aaronson, French, and MacDonald (2008) 
demonstrated that a strong price effect of the minimum wage is always accompanied by a 
disemployment effect, as both of these changes are associated with an increase in firms’ 
marginal costs. The lack of a strong disemployment effect in surviving firms in Seattle and 
mixed evidence on the price adjustment suggests that the minimum wage in Seattle had only a 
mild impact on the marginal costs of surviving firms. 
BUSINESS ENTRY AND EXIT 
In this section we turn to the extensive margin effects of the minimum wage. We start by 
examining the rates of business entry and exit. Table 10 shows our estimates. We see that the 
$11 minimum wage did not affect the rates of business entry and exit, whereas the $13 minimum 
wage increased the rate of business exit but had no effect on the rates of business entry. A 1 
percent cost of compliance led to a 0.2 percentage point increase in the exit rate. Considering that 
51 percent of firms faced a positive cost of compliance in 2016, and that average cost of 
compliance was 3.44 percent, our estimates show that the minimum wage raised the exit rate of 
exposed firms from 5.08 percent to 5.77 percent, or by 13 percent. Moreover, because exposed 
firms provide 84 percent of low-wage jobs, defined as those paying less than 130 percent of the 
minimum wage, an uptick in exit rates led to a 0.58 percent decline in hours worked in low-wage 
jobs. 
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Table 10  Effect of the Minimum Wage on Rates of Entry and Exit 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 $11 Minimum wage  13 Minimum wage 
 Exit Exit Entry Entry  Exit Exit Entry Entry 
 Treatment Placebo Treatment Placebo   Treatment Placebo Treatment Placebo 
Panel A: Timing of the effect 
GAP × t = −3 0.18** 0.06 -0.40 -0.89      
 (0.08) (0.05) (0.31) (0.69)      
GAP × t = −2 0.18 0.06 -0.44 -0.61  0.15*** 0.048* -0.26 -0.16 
 (0.14) (0.09) (0.35) (0.49)  (0.03) (0.03) (0.25) (0.18) 
GAP × t = −1 0.12 0.0091 -0.46 -0.43  0.30*** 0.055 -0.22 -0.042 
 (0.14) (0.10) (0.37) (0.37)  (0.06) (0.04) (0.25) (0.14) 
GAP × t = 0 0.066 0.048 -0.41 -0.30  0.26*** 0.045 -0.23 0.06 
 (0.17) (0.12) (0.37) (0.31)  (0.05) (0.05) (0.26) (0.13) 
GAP × t = 1 0.14 0.01 -0.37 -0.14  0.20*** 0.062 -0.23 0.06 
 (0.17) (0.13) (0.36) (0.24)  (0.05) (0.05) (0.27) (0.14) 
GAP × t = 2 0.33* 0.07 -0.39 0.02  0.15*** 0.05 -0.23 0.06 
  (0.20) (0.12) (0.39) (0.21)   (0.05) (0.05) (0.27) (0.14) 
Obs 313,367 237,965 50,806 41,128   262,345 198,305 28,383 22,413 
R2 0.03 0.03 0.43 0.44   0.03 0.03 0.58 0.75 
Panel B: Average effect 
GAP × t < 0      0.022*** 0.05 -0.24 0.05 
      (0.04) (0.03) (0.25) (0.14) 
GAP × t ≥ 0 0.16 0.033 -0.14 -0.1  0.20*** 0.052 -0.23 0.00 
  (0.21) (0.11) (0.17) (0.13)   (0.05) (0.05) (0.26) (0.13) 
Obs 313,367 237,965 50,806 41,128   262,345 198,305 28,383 22,413 
R2 0.03 0.03 0.43 0.41   0.03 0.03 0.58 0.59 
Year-quarter-industry FE X X    X X   
Firm FE                   
NOTE: ***p< 0.001, **p< 0.01, *p< 0.05. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by the industry 
(NAICS 3-digit sector) and cohort (if more than one cohort). Sample: Surviving single-location firms that had five or more workers 
on payroll on average during the firms’ lifetime and have revenue data. All regressions include controls for firm size at the baseline 
and for firm age. GAP measures percentage increase in the total wagebill required to comply with the new minimum wage, 
assuming jobs and hours remain the same. 
SOURCE: UI records from WA state, 2005–2016. 
 
 
This result is consistent with the previous findings on the minimum wage effects to entry 
and exit in Aaronson et al. (2018) and Luca and Luca (2018), who also find a spike in exit rates 
of restaurants following the minimum wage increase. An uptick in exit rates also shows that the 
minimum wage increased the marginal costs of some firms, which made them no longer 
profitable. Next, we study the impact of the minimum wage on the composition of entering and 
exiting businesses. For exits, we estimate whether the average hours worked, revenue, and 
wagebill in firms that exited following the minimum wage hike were higher or lower than the 
same outcomes in firms that exited in the years before the minimum wage hike. Formally, we 
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compare the ratio of average hours worked, revenue, and wagebill in exiting firms to the average 
hours worked, revenue, and wagebill of a typical firm at the baseline, and we evaluate if this 
ratio changed after the minimum wage hike. We repeat this exercise for the entering firms using 
the ratio of average hours worked, revenue, and wagebill in entering firms to the average hours 
worked, revenue, and wagebill of a typical firm at the baseline.  
Our results on the composition of entering and existing firms are presented in the Table 
11. We find after the implementation of the $11 minimum wage, revenue per hour of existing 
firms increased, but there were no other changes to entering or existing firms. However, the $13 
minimum wage had a pronounced effect both on the composition of entering and exiting firms. 
Businesses that exited in 2016 paid lower average wages, had lower revenue productivity, and 
provided substantially more low-wage jobs than a typical business in their cohort, compared to 
existing firms in 2005–2013. The impact on hours in low-wage jobs was especially large. A 1 
percent cost of compliance increased the ratio of hours in low-wage jobs in exiting firms to hours 
in low-wage jobs in all active firms by 2.3 times. This increase translated into an additional 0.23 
percent loss in employment in hours of jobs paying less than 130 percent of the minimum wage, 
or $15.60. Just as in the case with the increased exit rate, this finding suggests that businesses 
that employed low-wage workers were unable either to pass the increases in marginal costs to 
consumers or to change their technology of production, and were forced to exit instead. 
Finally, the $13 minimum wage also resulted in substantial changes to the composition of 
entering businesses. Following the minimum wage hike to $13, entering businesses became less 
labor intensive. We see that the labor costs of the average entering firm were reduced by 6.2 
times relative to the labor costs of all active firms at the baseline, and average hours of entering 
firms were reduced by 7.6 times relative to hours of all active firms at baseline. These findings  
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Table 11  Effect of the Minimum Wage on the Composition of Entering and Exiting Businesses 
 $11 Minimum wage (MW)   $13 Minimum wage 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Treatment Treatment Placebo Placebo  Treatment Treatment Placebo Placebo 
 Exiting Entering Exiting Entering  Exiting Entering Exiting Entering 
 firms firms firms firms  firms firms firms firms 
Average wage rate 0.22*** -1.30 0.05 -0.32  -1.70*** 0.16 -0.18** -0.55 
 (0.09) (1.10) (0.25) (0.55)  (0.18) (1.40) (0.08) (0.37) 
Average labor costs 0.43 -1.10 -0.37 -1.80**  -0.23 -6.20* -0.60*** -0.72 
 (0.44) (6.60) (0.54) (0.85)  (0.15) (3.40) (0.20) (1.20) 
Average revenue 0.55 1.20 1.60 1.30  0.30 -4.70 0.34 -0.71 
 (0.44) (4.90) (1.80) (3.40)  (0.32) (3.70) (0.32) (1.00) 
Average revenue per hour 4.60*** 0.23 1.70 -1.00  -0.75*** -1.30 -0.59* 0.95 
 (1.10) (1.40) (2.10) (1.00)  (0.26) (2.80) (0.31) (1.00) 
Average total hours -0.42 0.52 -0.69* -1.7***  0.18 -7.60*** -0.43** -0.68 
 (0.44) (6.60) (0.40) (0.57)  (0.29) (2.40) (0.20) (1.00) 
Average hours in:          
Jobs paying <120% of MW -2.60 9.50 -2.30 -0.28  3.10*** -9.60*** 0.09 1.20 
 (2.00) (6.90) (1.70) (1.70)  (0.69) (3.50) (0.79) (1.80) 
Jobs paying <125% of MW -2.20 8.80 -2.00 0.43  2.70*** -11.00*** 0.00 0.77 
 (1.60) (7.10) (1.40) (1.80)  (0.66) (3.40) (0.73) (1.40) 
Jobs paying <130% of MW -2.00 8.20 -1.90 0.62  2.30*** -11.00*** -0.08 0.70 
 (1.50) (7.50) (1.40) (2.20)  (0.58) (3.30) (0.66) (1.20) 
Obs 276,161 276,161 208,751 208,751   235,325 235,325 177,690 177,690 
Cohort-quarter-industry FE X X X X  X X X X 
Firm FE  X  X   X  X 
NOTE: ***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors in regressions for exit are 
clustered by industry (NAICS 3-digit sector) and cohort.  
SOURCE: UI records from WA state, 2005–2016. 
 
 
imply that the minimum wage increased the marginal costs of labor-intensive businesses and 
made a labor-intensive business model unsustainable. As a result, only less labor-intensive 
businesses chose to open for business. The change in the composition of the entering businesses 
also translated into further employment losses in low-wage jobs. On average, hours in jobs 
paying less than 130 percent of the minimum wage decreased by 0.43 percent due to the shift to 
less labor-intensive businesses. 
MINIMUM WAGE ACCOUNTING 
We have estimated the impacts of the minimum wage to surviving businesses, as well as 
to the rates of entry and exit and to the composition of entering and exiting businesses. In this 
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section, we provide a bird’s eye view of our findings and discuss the contribution of each 
adjustment channel to the total impact of the minimum wage. 
Table 12 shows the total impact of the minimum wage on each outcome of interest. 
Overall, we find that the $11 minimum wage was largely absorbed by Seattle’s labor market and 
had a negligible impact on employers. However, the $13 minimum wage put enough cost 
pressure on employers to induce adjustment along several margins. Though the minimum wage 
caused a one-to-one increase in labor costs per one percentage point increase in the wage rate in 
surviving firms, the total wagebill of all employers increased only by half as much as did the 
wage rate. Moreover, the extensive margin effect was equally split between the effects on exit 
and on the composition of the entering businesses. Our results clearly show that surviving firms 
were able to sustain higher labor costs as compared to the new businesses. Surviving employers 
likely were able to benefit from reduced turnover, which offset some of the increases in direct 
labor costs (see Jardim et al., 2018, for the evidence on turnover reductions after the minimum 
wage hike in Seattle). However, entering businesses could not take advantage of this channel 
because they had no pre-minimum wage employees and therefore higher retention rates could 
not generate savings for them. As a result, entering businesses had to bear the burden of the 
increase in labor costs. Since higher labor costs generally increase marginal costs as well, 
making some business model unprofitable, entering businesses shifted towards less labor-
intensive technology and substantially reduced labor costs and hours worked at all wage levels as 
compared to entering businesses in the pre-policy time period. Finally, the minimum wage 
increased the exit rate because some businesses were not able to offset the increases in labor 
costs either by passing them to consumers in the form of higher prices or by benefiting from 
reduced turnover. 
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Table 12  Total Impact of the Minimum Wage and Contribution of Extensive and Intensive Margin 
 Surviving 
firms 
Exit 
rate 
Composition 
of exiting 
firms 
Entry 
rate 
Composition 
of entering 
firms 
Total 
impact, 
% 
Panel A. $11 Minimum wage (MW) 
Average wage rate 0.45     0.45 
Labor costs 0.51 - - - - 0.51 
Revenue - - - - - 0.00 
Hours in all jobs - - - - - 0.00 
Hours in jobs paying <130% of MW -1.13 - - - - 1.13 
Panel B. $13 Minimum wage 
Average wage rate 0.95     0.95 
Labor costs 1.07 -0.25 - - -0.24 0.57 
Revenue 0.22 -0.21 - - - 0.02 
Hours in all jobs - -0.44 - - -0.30 -0.74 
Hours in jobs paying <130% of MW -0.66 -0.58 -0.23 - -0.43 -1.91 
NOTE: “-” indicates that the minimum wage had zero impact through this channel.  
 
 
The extensive margin adjustment played an essential role in the employment effect of the 
minimum wage. Overall, the $13 minimum wage reduced hours worked in all jobs in Seattle by 
0.7 percent and hours worked in jobs paying less than $15.60 by 1.9 percent. The entirety of the 
minimum wage effect on hours in all jobs came from the extensive margin effect. The minimum 
wage impact on low-wage jobs was roughly split 2:1 between the extensive margin and the 
intensive margin effects. Within-firm adjustment of surviving firms generated 36 percent of the 
disemployment effect, higher rates of business exit generated another 42 percent of the effect, 
and the shift of the entering businesses towards less labor-intensive technology produced the 
remaining 22 percent of the total effect. As a result, any analysis that focuses only on one of 
these margins will grossly underestimate the impact of the minimum wage in Seattle. 
Finally, while we estimate the employment elasticity of surviving firms to be –0.3 to –
0.8, our estimates of the aggregate employment effect imply a much larger employment elasticity 
of –2, which takes into account both intensive and extensive margin effects. 
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CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we study the impact of the minimum wage hike in Seattle on business 
outcomes using the UI records and the Business and Occupations Tax records from the State of 
Washington in 2005–2016. Due to Washington’s unique policy of collecting hours for every 
employee in the state, we can calculate hourly compensation for each employee and measure the 
costs of compliance with the minimum wage for each employer. Our data also allow us to 
investigate the impacts of the minimum wage hike on firms in all industries because we do not 
have to restrict our analysis to retail and restaurants as was the case in many prior studies in the 
United States. Finally, we are able to study the effects both to the intensive and the extensive 
margins and quantify their roles in the total minimum wage impact. 
We demonstrate that on average employers in Seattle faced low costs of compliance with 
the minimum wage, and many employers were not exposed to the minimum wage increase at all. 
In particular, an average employer had to increase their labor costs by 2–3 percent to comply 
with the ordinance, and 40–50 percent of employers had no workers paid less than the new 
minimum wage even before the ordinance was implemented. 
Despite the relatively low costs of compliance with the minimum wage, we find that the 
minimum wage had a pronounced effect on the labor market. First, the minimum wage had a 
ripple effect on wages of workers paid above the minimum. We estimate that employers raised 
wages of workers paid up to 130 percent of the minimum wage to decompress the wage 
distribution. This result is echoed by self-reported responses on adjustment channels collected 
through the Survey of Seattle’s Employers (Romich et al., 2019). Second, the minimum wage 
increased the labor costs of surviving firms by 1.2 percent and labor costs of all businesses by 
0.57 percent. Surviving firms adjusted to this increase by mildly reducing demand for low-wage 
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jobs, but largely did not pass the increases to prices. Findings in Jardim et al. (2018) suggest that 
reductions in turnover might have helped surviving firms sustain higher direct labor costs. 
Finally, we find that the minimum wage led to a 1.9 percent reduction in employment of low-
wage jobs, defined as those paying $15.60 and less. Over one-third of this effect was generated 
by surviving firms, while the remaining two-thirds of the effect was produced by an increased 
rate of business exit and by the shift in the composition of entering businesses towards less labor-
intensive technology. 
Our finding that more than half of the overall impact of the minimum wage low-wage 
jobs comes from the extensive margin is relatively novel. Aaronson et al. (2018) discuss the 
minimum wage effects in the context of a putty-clay model that can generate substantial 
extensive margin adjustment, and provide evidence of accelerated entry and exit following the 
minimum wage hike in the United States. However, because they use the aggregate data from the 
Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages, they are unable to attribute employment effects to 
entry or exit. 
Finally, an unusual feature of the business adjustment to the minimum wage in Seattle is 
the lack of the effect to prices. Multiple studies in the past found that passing the increases in 
labor costs to prices is a primary channel of adjustment to the minimum wage (Aaronson, 
French, and MacDonald, 2008; Allegretto and Reich, 2018; Harasztosi and Lindner, 2018). 
Understanding under what conditions employers adjust to the minimum wage via the product 
market versus labor market adjustment is a task for future work.  
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APPENDIX: ADDITIONAL TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
 
Figure A.1. Growth rate in cost of compliance and pseudo-cost (before the Minimum Wage Ordinance) 
of compliance over time. 
(a) $11 Minimum wage  `  (b) $13 Minimum wage 
                 
NOTE: Sample: Surviving single-location firms that had five or more workers on payroll on average during the firm’s lifetime and have revenue 
data. GAP measures percentage increase in total wagebill required to meet the new minimum wage, assuming jobs and hours remain the same. 
Vertical red dashed line shows the quarter when the minimum wage went up for the treated cohort and a comparable period for the control cohorts 
before the Minimum Wage Ordinance. 
SOURCE: UI records from WA state, 2005–2016 
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Table A.1. Exposure to the minimum wage hike, by industry. 
Industry Number of  Employment,   Firms with 
 firms  number of jobs  GAP>0 
 All Exposed  All Exposed  Mean Median 
 
firms firms,  
% 
 firms firms,  
% 
 GAP, 
% 
GAP, % 
Panel A: 2014 Cohort, subject to $11 minimum wage 
Construction 446 9.9  13,765 31.3  0.35 0.03 
Manufacturing 358 37.7  14,065 55.4  1.64 0.42 
Wholesale Trade 374 23.0  8,103 32.7  0.55 0.17 
Retail Trade 618 62.5  11,737 63.6  2.23 0.98 
Transportation and Warehousing 103 29.1  7,136 65.8  0.45 0.05 
Information 249 18.1  13,952 22.1  0.95 0.21 
Finance and Insurance 189 14.8  7,576 42.1  0.64 0.04 
Real Estate and Rental and Leasing 175 38.9  5,931 59.5  1.11 0.18 
Professional, Scientific, and Technical 
Services 
1,172 12.4  38,887 25.5  0.34 0.08 
Administrative and Support Services 313 34.8  13,779 69.6  1.10 0.20 
Health Care and Social Assistance 560 26.8  26,882 67.0  0.71 0.16 
Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation 124 65.3  8,247 90.4  1.68 0.33 
Accommodation and Food Services 1,282 80.2  36,514 87.7  3.07 0.96 
Full-Service Restaurants 713 83.0  20,156 88.3  2.01 0.62 
Limited-Service Restaurants 339 83.5  7,662 87.1  5.73 4.31 
Other Services (except Public Administration) 364 44.0  8,341 43.9  1.54 0.62 
Total 6,327 39.4   214,91
5 
54.6   2.05 0.47 
Panel B: 2015 Cohort, subject to $13 minimum wage 
Construction 470 22.3  16,718 37.6  0.57 0.08 
Manufacturing 367 55.9  14,743 67.6  2.67 0.89 
Wholesale Trade 376 38.0  8,546 51.7  1.26 0.45 
Retail Trade 666 74.6  13,199 71.9  5.06 3.25 
Transportation and Warehousing 99 43.4  7,746 73.3  1.16 0.56 
Information 259 26.3  17,273 25.4  1.46 0.16 
Finance and Insurance 189 20.6  7,743 47.4  0.68 0.11 
Real Estate and Rental and Leasing 181 47.5  6,188 66.9  1.68 0.44 
Professional, Scientific, and Technical 
Services 
1,178 20.5  40,192 32.6  0.63 0.15 
Administrative and Support Services 325 49.5  16,958 81.0  2.62 0.64 
Health Care and Social Assistance 551 37.0  29,127 79.0  1.71 0.51 
Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation 141 70.9  9,196 94.2  2.91 1.25 
Accommodation and Food Services 1,395 89.2  40,588 94.8  4.86 2.08 
Full-Service Restaurants 755 92.1  21,796 95.9  3.43 1.44 
Limited-Service Restaurants 388 89.9  9,184 92.3  8.54 6.72 
Other Services (except Public Administration) 380 58.4  8,577 74.3  2.91 1.03 
Total 6,577 51.1   236,79
4 
63.9   3.44 1.15 
NOTE: Sample: Single-location firms which had five or more workers on payroll on average during their lifetime and have revenue data. Agriculture, 
Mining, Utilities, Management of Companies and Enterprises, Educational Services, and Public Administration were excluded from the sample due 
to small sample sizes. GAP measures percentage increase in total wagebill required to comply with the new minimum wage, assuming jobs and hours 
remain the same.  
SOURCE: UI records from WA state, 2005–2016. 
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Table A.2. Effect of the $11 minimum wage on the wagebill. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)a (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Treatment Treatment Treatment Treatment Placebo Placebo Placebo Placebo 
     Pseudo Pseudo   
 Treated Treated All All Treated Treated All All 
 cohort cohort cohorts cohorts cohort cohort cohorts cohorts 
  
GAP>0 All firms All firms All firms GAP>0 All firms 
All 
firms 
All firms 
Panel A: Timing of the effect 
GAP × t = −3 -0.02 0.17 -0.43** -0.25 0.37* 0.62*** -0.17 0.19 
 (0.17) (0.16) (0.17) (0.17) (0.19) (0.18) (0.19) (0.22) 
GAP × t = −2 -0.37* -0.66*** -0.34* -0.17 -0.01 -0.30 0.18 0.20 
 (0.21) (0.19) (0.20) (0.19) (0.20) (0.18) (0.21) (0.22) 
GAP × t = −1 0.06 -0.26 -0.13 -0.04 0.13 -0.14 -0.13 -0.10 
 (0.23) (0.21) (0.20) (0.19) (0.22) (0.21) (0.24) (0.23) 
GAP × t = 0 0.08*** 0.71*** 0.94*** 1.10*** 0.61** 0.44* 0.93*** 0.95*** 
 (0.21) (0.19) (0.22) (0.21) (0.25) (0.23) (0.26) (0.24) 
GAP × t = 1 0.98*** 0.89*** 1.00*** 1.20*** 0.57** 0.47* 0.085*** 0.87*** 
 (0.23) (0.21) (0.23) (0.21) (0.27) (0.25) (0.26) (0.24) 
GAP × t = 2 0.40 -0.10 0.53*** 0.70*** 0.23 -0.52* 0.05 0.07 
  (0.29) (0.26) (0.25) (0.23) (0.29) (0.27) (0.28) (0.23) 
Obs 13,242 33,846 276,161 276,161 13,757 33,072 208,751 208,751 
R2 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.30 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.32 
Panel B: Average effect 
GAP × t ≥ 0 0.75*** 0.53*** 0.88*** 1.00*** 0.18 0.12 0.60*** 0.60*** 
  (0.21) (0.19) (0.20) (0.17) (0.21) (0.22) (0.23) (0.18) 
Obs 13,242 33,846 276,161 276,161 13,487 33,072 208,751 208,751 
R2 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.30 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.32 
Cohort-quarter-
industry FE 
  X X   X X 
Firm FE       X       X 
NOTE: ***p< 0.001, **p< 0.01, *p< 0.05. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by the industry (NAICS 3-digit sector) 
and cohort (if more than one cohort). Sample: Surviving single-location firms that had five o r  more workers on payroll on average during the firm’s lifetime 
and have revenue data. All regressions include controls for firm size at baseline and firm age. GAP measures the percentage increase in total wagebill required 
to comply with the new minimum wage, assuming jobs and hours remain the same. 
a Columns 3, 4, 7, and 8 include cohort-quarter-industry fixed effects (FE) from 2005–2016; columns 4 and 8 also include firm FEs. 
SOURCE: UI records from WA state, 2005–2016.   
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Table A.3. Effect of the $13 minimum wage on wagebill. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)a (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Treatment Treatment Treatment Treatment Placebo Placebo Placebo Placebo 
     Pseudo Pseudo   
 Treated Treated All All Treated Treated All All 
 cohort cohort cohorts cohorts cohort cohort cohorts cohorts 
  
GAP>0 All firms All firms All firms GAP>0 
All 
firms 
All 
firms 
All 
firms 
Panel A: Timing of the effect 
GAP × t = −2 0.25** 0.30*** 0.03 0.50*** 0.25*** 0.30*** 0.03 0.04 
 (0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.12) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) 
GAP × t = −1 0.089 -0.25* -0.087 0.39*** -0.048 -0.15* 0.025 0.034 
 (0.14) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
GAP × t = 0 0.62*** 0.25* 0.24* 0.71*** 0.067 -0.05 -0.03 -0.021 
 (0.16) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) 
GAP × t = 1 0.58*** 0.42*** 0.50*** 0.10*** 0.24*** 0.18** 0.29*** 0.30*** 
 (0.15) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
GAP × t = 2 0.73*** 0.53*** 0.74*** 1.20*** 0.26** 0.24** 0.29*** 0.30*** 
  (0.16) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.09) 
Obs 14,685 29,235 235,325 235,325 16,255 28,150 177,690 177,690 
R2 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.29 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.30 
Panel B: Average effect 
GAP × t < 0 0.02 0.02 -0.03 0.44*** 0.10 0.08 0.03 0.04 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) 
GAP × t ≥ 0 0.63*** 0.40*** 0.49*** 0.96*** 0.19** 0.12 0.18** 0.19** 
  (0.14) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) 
Obs 14,685 29,235 235,325 235,325 16,255 28,150 177,690 177,690 
R2 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.29 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.30 
Cohort-quarter-industry FE   X X   X X 
Firm FE       X       X 
NOTE: ***p< 0.001, **p< 0.01, *p< 0.05. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by the industry (NAICS 3-digit sector) 
and cohort (if more than one cohort). Sample: Surviving single-location firms that had five o r  more workers on payroll on average during the firm’s 
lifetime and have revenue data. All regressions include controls for firm size at baseline and firm age. GAP measures the percentage increase in total 
wagebill required to comply with the new minimum wage, assuming jobs and hours remain the same. 
a Columns 3, 4, 7, and 8 include cohort-quarter-industry fixed effects (FE) from 2005–2016; columns 4 and 8 also include firm FEs. 
SOURCE: UI records from WA state, 2005–2016. 
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Table A.4. Effect of the $13 minimum wage on prices and mean wage rate  
for employers for which prices were collected. 
  (1) (2) 
 Unweighted Weighted 
Dependent variable: %∆Mean price 
GAP × 2016.1 0.10 -0.13 
 (0.12) (0.15) 
GAP × 2016.2 0.17 0.10 
 (0.15) (0.15) 
Obs 89 89 
R2 0.04 0.04 
Dependent variable: %∆Mean wage rate 
GAP × 2016.1 0.41*** 0.43*** 
 (0.15) (0.11) 
GAP × 2016.2 0.32** 0.41*** 
 (0.13) (0.11) 
Obs 93 93 
R2 0.09 0.18 
NOTE: ***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05. Clustered standard errors in 
parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by firm identifier. Sample: Surviving 
single-location firms that have revenue data. GAP measures percentage increase in 
total wagebill required to comply with the new minimum wage, assuming jobs and 
hours remain the same.  
SOURCE: UI records from WA state and data on prices collected by the authors, 
2015–2016. 
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